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ABSTRACT 
Geopolitical Influences on German Development Policies in Africa and AIDS 
Policies in Kenya. (August 2006) 
Veit Bachmann, Vordiplom, University of Trier 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Peter J. Hugill 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century Germany geopolitics can be 
characterized by its grand strategy as a civilian power. Germany has come to depend on 
a civilianized international system based on multilateralism, international institutions 
and the rule of law, supranational integration, free trade, and the restriction of the use of 
force as a means for international politics. Such a system requires the players in it to be 
peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, legitimate and law-abiding. Many 
African countries do not fulfill those conditions. Extremely high prevalence rates of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa severely undermine social structure, economic development and 
political stability and thus contribute to state failure. State failure is in fundamental 
conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest in promoting a civilianized 
international system, because a failing state is incapable of creating civilianized 
structures.  
After analyzing Germany’s foreign and development policies since World War 
II, I came to the conclusion that all German foreign policies aim at promoting a 
civilianized international system. I am arguing that development policies are part of 
broader foreign policies and thus pursue this goal with respect to developing countries. 
However, for the system itself it is much more important that the big players in the world 
are included and committed to it. Therefore, German foreign policy focuses on the major 
powers in the world and, just as developing countries play a minor role in international 
politics, development policies play a minor role in Germany’s grand strategy as a 
civilian power. German grand strategy, however, plays a major role in the design and the 
conduct of German development policies, policies used as tools to pursue Germany’s 
broader geopolitical interest in promoting a civilianized international system.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
 
German geopolitics has resulted in devastating consequences for Europe and the 
World in the first half of the twentieth century. During the second half of the twentieth 
century Germany abandoned its military aggressiveness and became thoroughly 
integrated into an international system of liberal capitalism based on American 
hegemony. Multilateralism, international law and institutions, supranational integration, 
and the restriction of the use of force became central aspects of German foreign policy. 
Its main geopolitical interest today is to promote such a ‘civilianized’ international 
system. 
Changing geopolitical conditions in the 1990s have made state failure in sub-
Saharan Africa, exacerbated by HIV/AIDS, a threatening factor for such a civilianized 
international system. Through globalization and increased global interdependencies the 
situation in a supposedly remote part of the world can have major impacts on the 
international system. Germany and other Western countries have realized the importance 
of counteracting the problems in Africa before they become problems for their own 
national interests. After reunification in 1990, Germany went through a phase of political 
reorientation to find its place in the post-Cold War world and eventually sought to 
engage more actively in global politics and on the African continent. 
German foreign policy is rooted in its grand strategy as a civilian power, which 
aims to promote a civilianized international system. With respect to Africa, German 
foreign policies are mainly development policies. There is vast literature on both 
Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power and its foreign political behavior with 
respect to the main actors in the international system. But there is a lack of knowledge 
about the influence of Germany’s grand strategy on its policies with regard to the 
developing world. As a consequence, it is unclear to what extent Germany’s broader 
geopolitical interests, as rooted in the civilian power concept, influence development 
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policies in Africa. Hence, the central question of this research is how German 
development policies are influenced by the geopolitical interest of creating a civilianized 
international system. German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya are used as an 
example to illustrate this connection.  
Various factors influence development policies. The most common argument is 
that the underlying reasons are either idealist, such as humanitarian motives, or realist, 
such as strategic political interests. Ferguson introduces a third possibility by arguing 
that development policies are mainly driven by bureaucratic structures and the attempt to 
justify their own existences (Ferguson 1990). However, the goal of this research is not to 
precisely assess which motivation is the most influential driver for development policies. 
Rather, this study focuses on the realist motivation and aims to show how geopolitical 
interests influence development policies.  
The central claim is that broader geopolitical interests are a major underlying 
factor that determines German development policies and projects. In chapter I I identify 
3 phases of German geopolitical interests. First, Wilhelmine Germany. Second, Nazi 
Germany. Third, the Federal Republic of Germany, mainly in its mature phase after 
German reunification in 1990. For all three phases there is substantial academic 
literature with respect to German foreign policies and German interests in Africa. 
However, the development and the connection of the 3 phases have not been sufficiently 
addressed. Chapter I discusses the evolution of the three phases of Germany’s 
geopolitical interests and deals with the historical background of Germany’s current 
interest in Africa.  It starts with the first German outreach to Africa and its acquisition of 
colonies during the imperial period of the ‘Grab for Africa’ before World War I. This 
was based on an aggrandizing mind set within both the German population and elites 
and the perception that Germany needed to import resources and acquire colonies for 
prestige in order to compete with other great powers (Grumbach 1917; Fischer 1967; 
Stoecker 1986).   
Chapter I continues to discuss German expansionism and plans for world 
domination during the Nazi period. The geopolitical plans of the Nazi-leadership were 
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not identical with the academic geopolitics associated with Karl Haushofer. With respect 
to Africa, German interests were very limited and based mostly on a general opposition 
to the Treaty of Versailles which ended German colonialism (Haushofer 1934; 
Whittlesey 1939, 1942, 1943; Dorpalen 1942; Ebeling 1994).  
The next section of chapter I deals with German-African relations during the 
Cold War. In the first decades after the end of World War II, Germany’s prime interest 
was in being integrated as a trustworthy and respected partner in the American led 
international system. This was reflected in German Africa policies. The prime interest 
during that period was to counteract Soviet influence on the African continent and to 
include African countries in the American world-economy. The underlying motivations 
were ideological reasons as well as the availability of African resources (Engel 2000; 
Hofmeier 2002; Mair 2002).  
Finally, the last section of chapter I deals with Germany’s interest in Africa after 
reunification in 1990. After an initial phase of disinterest, Germany developed a rather 
intense ‘global order’ interest in Africa, when it realized that the situation in Africa 
could have significant impacts on its own national interest. This ‘global order’ interest 
refers to the creation of civilianized structures in Africa which are essential for the 
inclusion of African countries into a civilianized international system Germany needs to 
act effectively (Maull 1993, 2004; Engel and Olson 2005b; Kühne 1999; Mair 2002; 
Frenkler et al 1997; Kirste and Maull 1996; Meinig 2004).  
Chapter II addresses the problems of HIV/AIDS and state failure in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The literature reviewed for this chapter covers the problems associated with 
HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa. Even though it is well documented how these 
problems affect international security, no academic work has examined how they relate 
specifically to Germany’s current geopolitical interest. The goal of chapter II is, thus, to 
show how the problems associated with HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa undermine 
Germany’s vision of a civilianized international system.  
In the first section I outline how severely the pandemic has affected sub-Saharan 
Africa. Only 10 percent of the global population lives in sub-Saharan Africa, but the 
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region is home to more than two thirds of all people living with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 
2000 – 2005) 
The second section deals with the effects of the pandemic on state and society. 
HIV/AIDS has severe impacts on social structure, economic development, and political 
stability in many countries in Africa. Even though HIV/AIDS affects all sectors of state 
and society, the ones most impacted are education, agriculture and security forces. As 
such the disease undermines state capacity and is, therefore, conducive to state failure 
(Elbe 2002, 2003; Price-Smith 2002; Kalipeni et al 2004).  
In the third section of chapter II, I explain the problems associated with state 
failure. Many countries in Africa are considered as weak states with a high risk of state 
failure. I outline five characteristics of state failure and contrast them to the ideals of a 
civilian power in order to show that state failure is in fundamental conflict with 
Germany’s prime geopolitical interest in a civilianized international system (King and 
Zeng 2001; Crocker 2003; Rotberg 2003).  
The third chapter deals more intensely with Germany’s foreign and development 
policies. In the first section, the foreign political behavior of Germany as a civilian 
power is discussed and also contrasted to the foreign political behavior of the United 
States as a great power. I argue that for most of the period since 1945 Germany has been 
a free-rider in an international system provided by the United States, and that this has 
significantly shaped German interests and foreign policy. This system was favorable to 
Germany to develop into both a civilian power and a classical trading state. As such 
Germany has no choice but to use its full energy and all its foreign political tools to 
promote such a global order. Development policies are one of those tools (Maull 1990, 
1993; Kirste and Maull 1996; Agnew and Corbridge 1995, Agnew 2005).  
The second and third section of chapter III go into more detail on development 
policies. The second section deals with German development policies in general and 
how they are conceptualized. After the end of the Cold War there were two major 
changes in German development policies. The first occurred in 1991 and tied German 
development cooperation to five conditions. The second was in 1998 when the German 
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government changed from Kohl’s center-right to Schröder’s center-left administration. 
Schröder’s government reversed the trend of decreasing official development assistance 
(ODA) and introduced the concepts of Schwerpunktbildung – priority setting of 
development cooperation - and Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss – seamless 
development cooperation (BMZ 2004 – 2006; OECD 2006). 
The third section of chapter III gives an example of German development 
policies by discussing the German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya. Kenya is a 
priority partner country for German development cooperation and reproductive health is 
one of the three German development priorities in Kenya. Germany has worked in the 
health sector in Kenya for three decades, and in the AIDS sector in Kenya for almost 
two. It thus has had a major impact on the design of the Kenyan approach to counteract 
the pandemic and the programs of the two countries in that field are now largely similar 
(EFRG 2005; BMZ 2003 – 2006).  
Finally, the last section of chapter III examines the influence of German 
geopolitical interests on its development policies. After having outlined what a civilian 
power strives for internationally in section 3.1 and how German development policies 
operate in sections 3.2 and 3.3, the connection between the two is discussed in section 
3.4. I introduce six practical examples to show this connection. Furthermore, I compare 
the five major characteristics of the civilian power concept and of German development 
policies as they are each theoretically outlined in the literature. Both the practical 
examples and the comparison of theoretical criteria clearly show that German 
development policies are deeply embedded in its grand strategy as a civilian power.  I 
am not trying to show that development policies are an important part of German grand 
strategy, but that the grand strategy is the major influencing factor on German 
development policies. This means that, despite the increased relevance development 
policies have experienced within the German foreign political framework since 1998, 
they are still clearly subordinate to broader German geopolitical interests and are not 
much more than tools to pursue such interests.  
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This chapter introduces the relevant literature on Germany’s foreign political 
behavior as a civilian power and on German development policies. Building on this 
literature and using the information obtained during field work in Kenya and Germany 
between June and August 2005, I address the lack of knowledge about how German 
development policies are influenced by its grand strategy.  
Preparation for the fieldwork of this research included acquiring detailed 
knowledge in three main categories, each reflected in a separate chapter. First, German 
geopolitics in its historical framework and its current form. Second, the problems of 
HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa. Third, German foreign and development policies 
and the programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya.  
The methods used for the first category focused on literature research of the work 
of American, British, and German geographers, historians and political scientists on that 
topic. Through the study of the relevant academic work on historical and current German 
geopolitics, I was able to identify three eras of German geopolitical interests regarding 
Africa: Wilhelmine acquisition of colonies for resources and prestige; Nazi lack of 
concern with colonies; and the promotion of a civilianized international system in the 
second half of the twentieth century.   
The information for the second chapter was obtained through the study of the 
relevant literature on state failure, epidemiology and HIV/AIDS. Publications and data 
provided by United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) were also an 
important data source. More detailed knowledge of the impact of HIV/AIDS on society, 
in Kenya in particular, is also based on semi-structured interviews conducted during my 
fieldwork in Kenya between June and August 2005. Interviewees with respect to 
HIV/AIDS included managers or representatives of: 
- the Kenyan National AIDS Control Council (NACC), the central agency of 
the Kenyan government to coordinate all efforts in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS; 
- UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; 
- Crystal Hill, an NGO working towards the creation of a HIV free generation; 
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- Strengthening STD/HIV Control Project in Kenya, a joint project of the 
University of Nairobi and the University of Manitoba which aims at 
promoting condom use and controlling the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs) and HIV; 
- Wakibe HIV/AIDS Community Support Project, a community based project in 
Huruma, Nairobi which provides care, counseling and medication for orphans 
and people living with HIV/AIDS; 
- Extreme Impact, a community based organization in the slum of Mathara, 
Nairobi aiming to create AIDS awareness, de-stigmatizing the disease and 
promoting condom use; 
- Makindu Primary School. Interview with the head teacher of a primary 
school in rural Kenya (Kiungani, Kitale), which faces the problem of many 
AIDS-orphans in the school. 
 
After having identified the problems associated with HIV/AIDS and state failure 
in Africa, I contrast those problems with the prime German geopolitical interest of 
promoting a civilianized international system. 
Information for the third chapter derives from the study of the academic literature 
on German foreign and development policies. However, it also includes material dealing 
with the nature of current geopolitics and the nature of the international system. This 
academic component mainly builds on the works of American, British, and German 
geographers and political scientists. It contrasts traditional great power behavior, 
currently exemplified by the Untied States, with Germany’s behavior as a civilian 
power. In addition, I studied official German documents of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs (AA), the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and 
other organizations. This review of official documents was added to by the study of 
speeches of leading international politicians in order to find out what the official policies 
are with regard to Africa and with respect to HIV/AIDS in Kenya. Information was also 
obtained through the interviews mentioned in the methodology for chapter II and 
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additional semi-structured interviews conducted during field work in Kenya between 
June and August 2005 and in Germany in August 2005. The interviewees were mostly 
sector coordinators of the following institutions: 
- German Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya; 
- Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the main German 
organization for official technical development cooperation (2 interviewees); 
- Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW), a development bank as the main 
German organization for official financial development cooperation; 
- Auswärtiges Amt  (AA), the German Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
 
Finally, I compared the information gathered about German development 
policies in Africa and the HIV/AIDS programs in Kenya with the grand strategy as a 
civilian power in order to find out how the latter influences the former. In order to 
protect the identity of the interviewees who requested anonymity, I only mention their 
affiliation and refer to them as Interviewee A, B, C etc. in the text.   
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CHAPTER II 
GERMAN GEOPOLITICS AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA 
 
This chapter deals with the historical background of Germany’s interest in Africa 
with respect to the time periods before World War I and II and the Cold War. It further 
addresses geopolitical changes in the 1990s and explains how Germany developed the 
grand strategy of a civilian power and the promotion of a civilianized international 
system as its prime geopolitical interest. 
 
German Imperialism before 1914 
 
May we obtain in that peace a powerful African Colonial Empire and a 
sufficiently large number of strong bases on the globe for our navy, and 
for our commerce, for coaling stations and wireless telegraphy. (Duke 
Johann Albrecht von Mecklenburg, quoted in Grumbach 1917, 9-10) 
 
The unification of Germany in the Kaiserreich in 1871 was the political 
manifestation of the ambitions of the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck (1815-
1898) to establish Germany as one of the Great Powers. After three successful wars with 
Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870/71) he ensured Prussian dominance 
within Germany and German dominance in Europe. As German chancellor he took the 
lead to install the Prussian king Wilhelm I as the German emperor and, therefore, the 
head of a federal state encompassing the political entities of Bavaria, Baden, 
Württemberg, Saxony, Hesse, Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. The Kaiserreich was 
Bismarck’s creation. His good old friend Wilhelm I played along as the German 
emperor, but in fact it was Bismarck who determined the politics of the young German 
Reich.  
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Africa was not of great concern for German politics at that time. The individual 
German states had neither the power nor interest in acquiring overseas possessions. In 
addition, after unification Bismarck had a rather reluctant attitude towards colonialism. 
Asked for Germany’s colonial ambitions in Africa he replied: “Here is Russia and there 
is France, and Germany is right in between. This is my map of Africa” (translated and 
quoted from Mair 1999). However, it became obvious that a Germany striving for world 
power status had a significant disadvantage compared to European colonial powers when 
it came to the availability and abundance of resources. Especially Britain, based on its 
dominance of the oceans and in global trade, could draw on all kinds of resources from 
its huge formal and informal empire. If Germany sought to rise to the status of world 
power, it needed to improve its access to resources.  
From the middle of the 19th century on Germany universities and research 
institutions improved impressively with considerable results in producing synthetic 
materials as substitutes for natural products. This became necessary in the various 
German states because of the economic disadvantage they faced compared to their 
European competitors that could draw on colonial resources. For those reasons, 
Bismarck’s reluctance to acquire colonies intensified research in Germany and 
contributed heavily to what, in 1896, the British Royal Commission on Technical 
Instruction called “a noble and intense belief in Wissenschaft (arts and sciences)” within 
German society (quoted in Pfetsch 1974, 331).   
However noble and intense this belief was, it was not intense enough to 
permanently eliminate German ambitions for overseas possessions. Fischer argues that 
“Germany was developing more and more into a highly industrialized exporting country, 
and the problem of finding markets and raw materials to support her population was 
growing increasingly urgent” (Fischer 1967, 11). Furthermore throughout the 1880s it 
became obvious that it was not only the availability of resources, but also prestige that 
made it essential for a great power to have some overseas possessions. So between April 
1884 and May 1885 Germany acquired all of its African protectorates: South-West 
Africa, Togo, Cameroon and Tanganyika. To underline the claim of the freshly unified 
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German Empire to play a major role in global politics, Bismarck organized the 
“International Africa Conference” in Berlin between November 15th 1884 and February 
26th 1885. By then every nation had at least somewhat of an imagination of the 
“unfathomed natural resources” the African continent bore, especially the Congo region. 
The “Berlin Conference” was partly motivated by the German proposal to establish an 
“international company” whose concern would be the exploitation of resources. It was 
the “most comprehensive international control attempted prior to the creation of the 
League of Nations” (Whittlesey 1939, 329-334).  
The fourteen participating nations agreed upon the division of Africa amongst 
European powers, which determined the current borders in Africa to a large extent. For 
Bismarck, the colonies were primarily trading posts, whereas the Deutscher 
Kolonialverein – the German Colonial Association – regarded them as a necessary step 
for German imperial politics (DHM 2004). This represented a general attitude in large 
parts of the German society, in particular amongst the industrial and political elites, 
which was embodied in the person of Wilhelm II (1859-1941). When he took the throne 
as German Kaiser in 1888 and dismissed Bismarck two years later, German foreign and 
colonial politics became far more aggressive. The new Kaiser represented a generation 
of Germans who had experienced nothing but a Germany that was growing, thriving, 
winning wars and gaining more and more political weight.  
 
The men of this generation which grew up in the late Bismarckian era 
were also convinced devotees of the ‘world policy’ devoted to securing 
for Germany a ‘place in the sun’, which the young Emperor had been 
quick to announce as his programme. It was the accession of Wilhelm II 
in July, 1888, that really unleashed the conservative-dynastic forces at 
home; those calling for pushful expansion abroad got their heads […] he 
was a ‘modern’ king who sought contact with savants, merchants and 
technicians and, like the British Prince of Wales (afterwards King 
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Edward VII), ‘covered’ the world as ‘the first commercial traveller’ of 
his people. (Fischer 1967, 7-8) 
 
Fischer points out correctly what made Wilhelm II so powerful: he had the 
support of the elites, especially the banking sector, but also of German society in 
general. There was a mindset of expansionism in Germany which called for a ‘world 
mission’, based not only on economic interest, but also on a ‘will to power’. The symbol 
for Germany’s elevated role in the world should be a merchant and naval fleet that 
would be able to compete with the British. If you want to interact with the world and 
influence large parts of it, you need to be able to get around. This was the first step to 
place Germany at an elevated level in the global power struggle and to reorganize the 
colonial status quo (Fischer 1967, 8-9).  
However, voices calling for an increased overseas engagement also had to face 
internal opposition. The internal struggle within Germany whether to be a land-power or 
a sea-power became apparent. Geographically there is a clear border-line within 
Germany that divided, and still divides, the country into two sides with contrasting 
opinions on this topic: the river Elbe. Germany east of the Elbe was traditionally a 
strongly agricultural region. Far less innovative and far more introvert it focused on its 
own development and was oriented towards the east and the eastern European landmass. 
This interest required a strong army, the epitome for German land-power, in order to 
secure the German eastern border, which did not have any natural borderline, from 
invasion or in order to expand more towards the east. Drang nach Osten – the Push to 
the East became the popular slogan. Germany west of the Elbe was far less continentally 
oriented. Having the powerful Ruhr industrial region, the Rhine valley around Cologne, 
as well as Hamburg and Bremen as trading and commercial centers, it strongly favored 
outward orientation towards the world. The industrial areas needed resources and sales 
markets abroad, the trading cities’ existence was based on global interactions. For both a 
strong fleet and overseas presence were essential.  
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The internal divide became clearly obvious, with western Germany favoring sea-
power and eastern Germany focusing on land-power (Mackinder 1942). Whittlesey 
observes as one of three “disclosed undercurrents of German life” an “unabated 
dichotomy between eastern Germany and western Germany in economic and social 
structure and in customs and outlook upon life” (Whittlesey 1943, 392). As a result 
“resumption of the traditional landward movement eastward was the dominant demand, 
especially in the eastern parts of the country, industrialized and commercial western 
Germany was vigorously urging the government to support a merchant marine, a navy, 
and overseas colonies” (Whittlesey 1942, 198). Wilhelm II tried to balance these 
interests by achieving both objectives, but knew very well that only with a strong 
international fleet could world power status be achieved. However, the global presence 
was seen somewhat as a by-product which would eventually come along once 
dominance on the European continent was achieved.  
For other major powers Germany’s reach for dominance on the European 
continent was not necessarily a new phenomenon. What was new was the strong German 
push to challenge Britain as a World Power at the end of the 19th century by building up 
a fleet and supporting the Boers in the second South African Boer War (1899-1902). 
Germany acted more and more as a global player and became increasingly interwoven 
with other countries. This became necessary because of its booming industry, which 
needed the import of raw materials for production and sales markets for exports.  
 
Table 1: Growth in trade of major countries between 1887 and 1912 
 Growth in Imports Growth in Exports Growth in Trade 
Germany 243 % 185.4 % 214.7 % 
United States 136.9 % 208.6 % 173.3 % 
England 108.7 %  113.1 % 
France 95 %  98.1 % 
Source: Fischer 1967, 12 
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Table 1 shows that, in the 25 years preceding World War I, German imports 
more than tripled from 3.1 million to 10 million Marks, an increase far more than in any 
other major country.  Exports almost tripled from 3.1 billion to 8.9 billion Marks, an 
increase that was only slightly exceeded by the United States. 
Most of this increase in Germany’s trade came from overseas countries. Bankers 
and traders were increasingly involved in the global financial market and invested in 
international projects. Industrial production increased and became more diversified from 
year to year. This development painfully revealed the obstacle Germany faced because 
of its limited access to global resources (Fischer 1967, 18). Therefore it is hardly 
surprising that leading German industrials, bankers and politicians called for an 
expansion of German overseas possessions. At the beginning of World War I Wilhelm 
Solf (1862-1936), the Secretary of State in the Reich Colonial Office, succeeded in 
making “the acquisition of a continuous Colonial Empire in Central Africa one of 
Germany’s official war aims.” His goal was to shift the nation’s ambitions to annex new 
territory from Europe to Africa by “emphasising the attractions of an autarchic economic 
area, guaranteed by enlarged colonial possessions, as a basis for world power status” 
(Fischer 1967, 102-103). As illustrated in figure 1, Solf’s Mittelafrika plans included  
 
that Portugal, although neutral, should cede to Germany Angola and the 
northern part of Mozambique as far as the Primera Islands […] the 
Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa as far north as Lake Chad, 
Togoland enlarged by Dahomey and in the north by a slice of 
Senegambia up to Timbuctoo, thus making the course of the Niger the 
northern frontier. (Fischer 1967, 102-103) 
 
The desire to control Mittelafrika was twofold. For one thing it derived from 
increasing imperial aspirations and the perceived need to establish an extensive system 
of coaling stations and naval bases around the African coasts and in the Southern 
hemisphere. Those naval bases were essential for the ambition of the German fleet to 
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operate globally and to challenge the British fleet on the world’s oceans. The other, at 
least equally important, drive for Mittelafrika lay in the economic benefits the control of 
resources in the area would bring. Raw materials from the resource-rich Katanga-region 
of the Congo and transportation routes to bring those to ocean-ports were at the focus of 
resource-oriented motives. 
                 
 
        Figure 1: Germany’s Mittelafrika plans. Source: Fischer 1967, 596 
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Even in 1918 the idea of Mittelafrika was still very much present as the letter of 
a German industrialist to Solf illustrates:  
 
Therewith the final hour of England’s world power and England’s world 
empire will have struck. In the course of centuries North America and 
Australia were Anglicised, South America Latinised. The time is at hand 
when Germany will be granted the power to Germanise virgin Africa. 
(quoted in Fischer 1967, 588)  
 
During World War I Germany’s Mittelafrika-plans were certainly less relevant 
than the Mitteleuropa-plans and despite the fact that they clearly failed they illustrate 
the “global aspects of Germany’s claim to become and maintain herself as a world 
power” (Fischer 1967, 590). The important part herein is that it was a general ambition 
of all parts of German society to expand its overseas possession and to create a German 
empire in Central Africa. The generation of Kaiser Wilhelm II had a strong desire for 
aggrandizement and to reach a ‘place in the sun’ for Germany. In that context Fischer 
emphasizes the “radical transformation which had taken place in the social, economic 
and political structure of Germany” in the decades preceding World War I. It created a 
“general conviction, which was reinforced by nation-wide propaganda, that Germany’s 
frontiers had become too narrow for her” (Fischer 1967, 11). These attitudes within 
society were probably more a driving factor for German expansionism than the strong 
navy and colonial pressure groups trying to push Wilhelm II to even more aggressive 
foreign policies.  
After the foundation of the Kaiserreich Germany went through an 
unprecedented and very successful phase of progress with respect to population growth, 
economic and political power, and industrialization, as well as technological, scientific 
and academic advancement. It was a general attitude that the time had come for 
Germany to expand. Britain was still the hegemon, but German elites saw British power 
declining and Germany’s rising. The thought of drawing level with Britain was 
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appealing and fascinating for Germans at the beginning of the 20th century. Wilhelm 
gave the population what it wanted: a vision of Germany’s ‘place in the sun’! His 
imperialism was not a result of the influence of a few megalomaniac military hardliners. 
Rather, it was rooted within German society and its perception of an ever-growing 
Germany. Part of that was the aim to acquire a large Colonial Empire in Central Africa 
and to establish Germany as a major colonial power. After the war the Treaty of 
Versailles put an end to German colonial possessions.  
 
The Origins of Geopolitik and Expansionism in Nazi-Germany  
 
Germany intends to dominate the world and has a plan for doing so. 
(Derwent Whittlesey, 1942) 
 
With the loss of its colonial possessions after World War I the German desire to 
control parts of the African continent did not completely die. Even the weak Weimar 
Republic had colonial ambitions and less than twenty years later Germany saw itself 
again in a situation to become a world power. The German ‘plan’ for world domination 
that Whittlesey mentions was largely developed by the geopoliticians surrounding Karl 
Haushofer (1869-1946), not by the German state. Influenced by the writings of the 
German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), the British geopolitician Halford 
Mackinder (1861-1947), and the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), 
Haushofer made Geopolitik an academic discipline, with a tremendous influence on the 
expansionist plans of the Nazi leadership.  
In 1904 Mackinder had developed what became known as his Heartland Theory. 
In the vast and resource-rich Eurasian landmass integrated by a network of railways and 
having access to both big oceans Mackinder saw “the conditions of a mobility of 
military and economic power” and believed that if one power – or an alliance of two 
powers - were to control this heartland the “empire of the world would […] be in sight” 
(Mackinder 1904, 434-436). After World War I Mackinder brought it down to the simple 
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formula ”Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland 
commands the World-Island: Who rules the World Island commands the World” 
(Mackinder 1942, 150). These thoughts are obvious in Haushofer’s writings. Haushofer 
regarded control of the territories to the east as the fundamental step for German 
aggrandizement and a dominant position on the European continent as well as in the 
world. The leadership of Nazi-Germany was impressed by Haushofer’s ideas, they 
basically presented a scientific justification for their own radical expansionist visions.  
However, Haushofer’s Geopolitik was not the same as Nazi expansionist 
ideology. One of the major motivations for the formulation of Haushofer’s ideas was to 
overcome the ‘Versailles-order’ of the European state system. The geopoliticians were 
very much aware that, due to the geographical position of Germany in the center of 
Europe, a stable and enduring order of states in central Europe would not be possible 
without the full inclusion and integration of Germany. They saw Germany endangered 
by being caught between two ideological systems: socialism to the East and capitalist 
liberalism to the West. Being caught between these radically differing systems posed the 
danger of falling apart into East and West Germany, each tied to its neighboring system. 
This problem already arose before World War I when the eastern parts of Germany 
favored a strong army as a land-power and the western parts called for a powerful navy 
to establish Germany as a sea-power.  
Germany continued to face exactly the same problem before World War II. 
Western Germany was outward oriented and needed global integration for raw materials 
and sales markets for its industrial products. Eastern Germany was inward oriented and 
needed state protection in order to maintain its agricultural production. However, the 
geopoliticians argued that neither could be allowed to become totally exposed to a free 
global market – the danger coming from the western model - or collectivized according 
to the eastern system. Therefore, the only way to preserve central Europe from being 
overrun by ‘exploitative’ western democratic capitalism or collectivist, eastern 
communism was to create an area in the middle of Europe, dominated by Germany, 
which offered a middle way.  
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Such a unified Europe would be an area where several peoples coexisted with the 
greatest possible internal freedom and diversity and maximum possible security of 
existence. The major fallacy in this concept was that the geopoliticians presumed that 
non-German European peoples had a fundamental interest in such a large central 
European area dominated by Germany and would, therefore, abandon ties to non-
European nations in favor of Germany. The geopoliticians were also fundamentally 
wrong to expect Germany under Nazi-leadership to act as an organizer for the benefit of 
all of central Europe so that it would have a bright future as a whole (Ebeling 1994, 145-
146). Hitler had no intention whatsoever in providing a bright future for any other 
peoples but Germans. He might have had an interest in providing a bright future for 
central Europe as a whole, but only as long as it was exclusively populated by Germanic 
people.  
Here Haushofer’s Geopolitik differed. It was similar to that of Hitler to the extent 
that it did not see a right of existence for the ‘liliput-states’ of middle-eastern Europe that 
were ‘artificially created’ in the Versailles Treaty. Those states Haushofer envisaged as 
being integrated into one of the bigger powers, Germany or Russia. A good relation 
between those was central to his ideas. The striking difference to Nazi ideology was that 
Haushofer definitely saw a right of existence for other peoples. Politically the area 
should be controlled by Germany, but the people within that area need not be exclusively 
German.  
This right of existence concept in Haushofer’s ideas can be traced back to the 
Monroe Doctrine, which he regarded as the legitimate model for his pan-regions. One of 
the initial intentions of the pan-regional concept was to reduce the number of potential 
conflict zones between the big powers by the exact determination of spheres of influence 
on the globe. Next to the British and the American pan-regional politics, Haushofer 
called for a German conception of space which “has nothing to do with exploitation or 
suppression, but is justified only by leadership”. This applies to Germany as a 
potentially leading power, but he also urged the great powers of the time to acknowledge 
Germany’s right to leadership. Within this context Haushofer leads the discussion to the 
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“constricted border of our [Germany’s] living space” and calls for a return to Germany’s 
“former, stolen right to space”. The only way to achieve this is not through “the 
adoration of violence” but through “politics based on the strict respect for the right of 
self-determination for both weak and strong peoples. Along with it, based on the motto 
‘honour, freedom, and equality’ such enormous opportunities may be created that entire 
generations will not be able to fully utilise them” (translated from Haushofer 1934, 151-
152).  
Thus, the striking difference to Nazi-plans was that the geopoliticians 
acknowledged several peoples in central Europe that should thrive and coexist under 
German dominance. The Nazi-leadership did not acknowledge this right for non-
Germans. Germany should rule the continent and have other peoples either driven out or 
serve the people of the Germanic race. By 1942 Heinrich Himmler, the commander of 
the SS, stated:  
 
Our duty in the East is not Germanisation in its earlier meaning that we 
impose German language and German law upon the population, but to 
ensure that only people of pure German blood populate the East. (quoted 
and translated from Ebeling 1994, 231) 
 
There is no such madness in the plans outlined by the geopoliticians. However, 
there are plenty of similarities, especially regarding German dominance in central and 
Eastern Europe. They differed regarding the organization of German dominance. The 
geopoliticians sought to create a sustainable stable system of big states and various 
peoples tied together in an area dominated linguistically, culturally, economically and 
politically by Germany. As outlined above, they falsely presumed that the European 
peoples wanted such a system and that it therefore could be stable (Ebeling 1994, 146-
147). However, the Nazis sought to ensure German dominance on the continent by 
suppression and the brutal use of force. Geoffrey Parker expresses this difference in the 
suggested behavior of Haushofer towards the Soviet Union. He favored luring the bear 
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with honey, contrary to the later Nazi-policy of trying to kill the bear (Parker 1985, 85). 
Without doubt, the geopoliticians’ plans were no more realistic than the ones of the 
Nazi’s, but they lacked their brutal insanity with its racial ideology.  
Nonetheless, the geopoliticians were certainly not completely free of Nazi-
ideology. Geopolitik was very influential on the programs of the Nazis, and vice versa. 
Haushofer also believed in the purity of blood with respect to natives in overseas 
protectorates, and argued that especially in Portuguese and Dutch colonies discontented 
people of mixed blood were causing a lot of problems for the leaders (Haushofer 1934, 
151). He argued for the German right to dominate central Europe; he did not see a right 
of existence for small states, and he was certainly close to the leadership of the Nazi-
party at least until 1938. The geopoliticians might not have fully shared the racial policy 
and the radical ideology of the Nazi party, but they also did not counteract it.  
 
Whatever reservation the Geopolitiker may have had about the methods 
employed by their Nazi masters, they went along with them and 
inevitably they were themselves tarnished by the crimes perpetrated in 
the name of race and Lebensraum. In this respect they were very little 
different from all the others who had hovered like moths around the Nazi 
candle when it was shining most brightly (Parker 1985, 82)                   
 
Parker is precisely right with this assessment. The ideas of the geopolitcians 
around Karl Haushofer were certainly not unconnected to Nazi-ideology, however, they 
were also not identical, as older scholars around Derwent Whittlesey argue.  
The geopoliticians drew on a concept of pan-regions. Haushofer envisaged a 
German pan-region in Europe, a pan-Europe that tied other parts of the world to it in a 
variety of ways, mainly economic, but also linguistic. Those ties should not have 
colonial character or exercise direct political or military control over overseas areas. He 
was very much aware of the problems Britain had with the administration and control of 
its colonies. Haushofer observed about the British Empire that “its space mastery is not 
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uncontested … It has become one of the most problematical political structures of our 
time” (Haushofer 1934, 28-29). Therefore, he clearly rejected extensive German 
expansion beyond Europe. For most of the 1930s this was also the policy of the Nazi-
regime. However, at the beginning of the 1940s the Nazi’s megalomania became 
increasingly boundless and they developed more specific ideas for world domination. 
 
Hitler was never content with simply repositioning Germany to its earlier 
power [pre 1914]; in order to realise his world power fantasies he needed 
the power of control over a much more powerful instrument: Europe. 
That’s why Hitler necessarily meant World War, because his goal to 
subdue Europe to his will and to force its peoples into a pan-region 
dominated by national-socialist Germany had to provoke the 
acrimonious resistance of the ones under threat and the entire free world. 
(translated from Ebeling 1994, 223-224) 
 
Nazi Germany sought to control Europe and to use this as a basis to control the 
world. However, with respect to Africa, this is how far the interests went. There were 
some strategic posts in Northern Africa it wanted to hold, but unlike before World War I 
there were no specific plans to create an empire in Africa or to annex certain parts of the 
continent. The global ambitions of Nazi-Germany included Africa as a part to be 
dominated, but no such particular intentions as before World War I existed with respect 
to the African continent, either in the plans of the geopoliticians, or in those of the Nazis.  
In addition, the Nazis lacked the broad popular support that Kaiser Wilhelm II 
had enjoyed with respect to German expansionism twenty-five years earlier. Germans in 
the Kaiserreich were obsessed with aggrandizement and an ever-growing Germany. 
Wilhelm’s expansionist politics were to a large extent driven by the society. This was 
not the case in the 1930s. Many Germans were opposed to the status quo as determined 
by the Treaty of Versailles and sought a more influential role for Germany. But the 
aggressive, militaristic, and brutal expansionism of the Nazi-regime was driven by the 
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Nazi-leadership, not by the broad population. This does not mean that the German 
population was heavily opposed to it, but it was not the driving factor, as was the case 
twenty-five years before. This was especially true with respect to German expansions 
beyond Europe. The population had hardly any interest in overseas possessions, although 
the German Colonial Society and the Colonial Committee in the Reichstag (the German 
parliament) kept the demand for the return of Germany’s colonies alive well into the 
1930s.  
 
On the whole, however, it was not a great popular movement … The 
mass of the German people was too much concerned with the problems 
of unemployment and inflation to care very much about the colonies. 
The policy of the Nazi party has been to arouse the maximum of public 
interest in the colonial question. With all the resources of their 
propaganda technique the present German leaders have stimulated ‘the 
spontaneous expression of the natural desire for the re-acquisition of 
colonies’, and the demand for return has of late been given special 
prominence in the Nazi political programme. (Bullock 1939, 47) 
 
Within the Nazi-party, the demand for the return of the colonies was mainly 
based in a general opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and the desire to elevate 
Germany’s role in the world. In that respect the geopoliticians had a similar approach to 
the Nazi-party:  they “never considered the acquisition of overseas colonies an economic 
necessity for Germany. To them, the restoration of the Reich to the status of a colonial 
power was solely a matter of national prestige” (Dorpalen 1942, 235). The main 
initiation of the ambitions to get the colonies back came from the groups mentioned 
above, not the Nazi-party, which did not have specific plans in Africa, but floated on its 
megalomaniac illusion of having the power and the right to dominate the entire world.  
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Africa and Germany During the Cold War 
 
I have to assert unambiguously that the Federal Government will continue 
to regard the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR through 
a third country, which it keeps official relations with, as an unfriendly act. 
(Konrad Adenauer 1955) 
 
After two unsuccessful attempts to be one of the world’s great powers in the first 
half of the 20th century, Germany’s role in international politics was radically diminished 
at the beginning of the second half. For the time of the Cold War, when Germany was 
divided into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), the term ‘Germany’ refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
Thus, “German policies” refers to the policies of Western Germany.  
Not only Germany’s role in international affairs, but also its influence on, and its 
interest in, the African continent were radically diminished. However, Mair outlines four 
categories of interests over the past 60 years that influenced German Africa policy 
according to the international situation and the national government. Those four interests 
are economic, political and strategic, ecological, and global order (Mair 2002, 11-16). In 
some cases the distinction is less clear than in others, as there are considerable overlaps, 
especially regarding ‘political and strategic’ and ‘global order’ interests. It is not always 
easy to clearly distinguish certain interests as one or the other. Nonetheless, Mair’s 
distinction provides a useful framework to explain the German engagement in Africa 
and put it in a broader political context.  
During the Cold War four distinct phases for German Africa policies can be 
identified: The first phase spanned the period 1949 through 1959 and was marked by a 
reintegration of Germany into international relations. During the second phase from 
1959 to 1970 German Africa policies were highly instrumentalized for the Cold War and 
for German-German policies that characterized the rivalry between the two German 
nations. After the rapprochement of the FRG with the GDR and the Soviet Union the 
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third phase between 1970 and 1982 was characterized by a stronger promotion of peace 
policies in Africa. In the fourth phase up to reunification in  1990 there was a strong 
focus on Southern Africa and classical development aid (Engel 2000, 2005). 
The first phase of German Africa policy was what Engel calls an “embryonic” 
phase. Germany’s colonial ambitions certainly ended with defeat in World War II, the 
country was busy rebuilding itself, and foreign policies were to a very large extent 
determined by Konrad Adenauer’s overall goal of Westintegration, the reintegration of 
Germany into the international community of states on the side of the United States of 
America. Dealing with the consequences of twelve years of totalitarian rule under the 
Nazi-regime, six years of war and four years of post-war political vacuum, there were 
clearly other topics on the political agenda than Africa. In addition, Africa was still 
almost completely under colonial rule and Germany would not engage in foreign 
political actions in Africa that might raise suspicions among the European colonial 
powers with which it was trying to normalize relations.  
In 1951 the opening of a Consulate General in Pretoria was the first German 
diplomatic mission to be established on the African continent and marked the beginning 
of diplomatic relations with other African countries in the following years. After 
Germany regained formal sovereignty in foreign policy matters in 1955, there was 
growing interest to be politically represented in as many countries as possible. In the 
early 1950s this was rooted to a large extent in economic interests. Being represented in 
Africa was as much a political desire as it was economic necessity. To establish trade 
links a political framework had to be created in Africa in the mid-1950s. In fact, it was in 
this “embryonic” phase of German Africa policy when the trade reached its highest 
numbers. With 9.1 percent of the total, German imports from Africa peaked in 1950, 
whereas the relative exports to Africa peaked at 6 percent of the total in 1954 (Hofmeier 
2002, 40).  
From the middle of the 1950s ‘political and strategic’ interests began to 
accompany economic interests. At that point, this was less caused by the growing rivalry 
between the two German states than by expectations of western partners. For the most 
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part the provision of development aid was the instrument to fulfill those expectations. It 
is no surprise that the first budget provisions for ODA (Official Development 
Assistance) were made as a result of political processes in Europe. During the 
negotiations that led to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1958  
 
France insisted on a formal association of its (then still existing) colonies 
with the EEC and the FRG government did not raise any objections in the 
interest of its overriding goals of forming the EEC and strengthening 
Franco-German cooperation. This set a precedent for many more years to 
come. (Hofmeier 2002, 40-41)  
 
The precedent was that Africa was simply not important enough to risk 
relationships with western partners. As a result, the German government accepted 
growing US and European demands for burden-sharing in international issues by 
1956/57. In 1959 German diplomats in Africa held their first conference in Addis Ababa 
to discuss the potential problems that might arise due to diverging interests between 
African countries seeking German support in their search for independence and 
Germany’s European partners (Hofmeier 2002, 41).  
However, the need for a political framework to deal with Africa was realized. To 
a large extent this political framework was determined by the Hallstein doctrine. Named 
after the State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt (AA – the German Foreign Ministry), 
Walter Hallstein, it determined German foreign policy for well over a decade. At the 
Four Power Conference in Geneva in 1955 the victorious allies acknowledged their 
responsibility in the question of German reunification, but at a follow up meeting a few 
months later, the foreign ministers of the US, France and the UK realized that Moscow 
had no specific interest in reunification. The Hallstein doctrine, created at a conference 
of ambassadors in Bonn in December 1955, was a reaction to this development. It 
rejected the prevailing territorial status quo, with Germany being reduced to the area of 
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the three western zones and claimed for the FRG the exclusive right to represent the 
entire German nation internationally. Diplomatic ties of the Soviet Union to both the 
FRG and the GDR were considered an exception that was justified by the status of the 
Soviet Union as an occupying power. However, with respect to any other country, the 
FRG would regard it as an ‘unfriendly act’ to establish diplomatic relations to the GDR 
and would, therefore, end its own diplomatic ties to the referring country (Engel 2000, 
39).  
The reason why the Hallstein doctrine became so important for Germany’s 
relations to Africa is that more and more African countries became independent during 
that time. These young nations were floating around in the ocean of international politics 
and found themselves in the middle of the Cold War struggle of the two superpowers. 
The Hallstein doctrine was strongly motivated by the interest to catch as many of them 
as possible and pull them on board the American vessel. Germany started to develop a 
strategic interest in Africa by trying to include freshly independent African nations into 
the American sphere of influence and the US-run world economy it was part of itself. By 
the late 1950s ‘political and strategic’ interests were far more influential for German 
Africa policies than economic interests, and remained so for most of the Cold War 
period due to Africa’s marginal share of the world economy.  
The second phase of German Africa policy was mainly determined by ‘political 
and strategic’ interests based on the ideology of the Hallstein doctrine and increased 
tensions between the superpowers. It was rooted in German-German policies based on 
counteracting the international presence of the GDR and its patron, the Soviet Union. 
The main foreign political goals of the FRG were to establish itself internationally as the 
only legitimate German state and to prevent international recognition of the GDR. As 
outlined above the policies towards the newly emerging African states were 
instrumentalized to serve this overall foreign political goal. The FRG engaged on the 
African continent through formal diplomatic contacts, networks of bilateral agreements 
in all fields, especially economics, and development aid. As a result of the geopolitical 
conditions of the Cold War and the division of Germany “West Germany nurtured its 
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new partners” (Engel 2005b, 109). Tetzlaff correctly points out that foreign policy 
towards Africa “was an external projection of internal German-German policies shaped 
by the global framework of East-West rivalry” (translated from Tetzlaff 1978, 28).  
The FRG quickly and abundantly opened diplomatic missions in African states in 
order to show its diplomatic presence on the continent. In 1959 Germany had only 6 
embassies in Africa, but in the following four years 26 more were opened in the big 
wave of decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. The main instrument Germany used to tie 
African countries to the Western sphere of influence was the provision of substantial 
development aid. Germany’s economy had regained considerable strength throughout 
the 1950s. The ‘social market economy’ concept of Ludwig Erhard, Minister for 
Economic Affairs, was an unprecedented success for recovery. It was largely responsible 
for the ‘economic miracle’ which boosted Germany’s economy to be one of the most 
powerful in the world in less than ten years.  
For the most part this German presence was welcomed by the young African 
nations, which saw the chance to establish ties with a country that was one of the leading 
economic powers, but hardly had a colonial past. As in most cases Germany had 
supported liberation movements, it became regarded as a mediator between African 
interests and the former colonial powers. Senior German civil servants remarked on the 
big advantage Germany had in African affairs: the loss of colonies more than 40 years 
ago (Engel 2000, 40). The lack of a significant colonial past, its support of liberation 
movements, and economic strength made Germany an attractive partner for African 
nations. Especially its economic wealth paid off fairly well for them in the form of ODA 
and was an advantage for the FRG in outdoing its rival to the East.  
  How seriously the German government pursued its strategic interests shows in 
the application of the Hallstein doctrine to Tanzania in 1964-65. When the revolutionary 
government of independent Zanzibar recognized the GDR, the FRG threatened the 
United Republic of Tanzania with the break-off of relations and a halt to ODA. It took 
several months to settle the dispute. Eventually the GDR embassy to Zanzibar was 
downgraded to a Consulate General in Dar es Salaam (Hofmeier 2002, 43). This crisis 
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was, however, the beginning of the end for the Hallstein doctrine. From the middle of 
the 1960s onwards the German government increasingly realized the very limited 
usefulness and practical relevance of the concept. When Willy Brandt was elected 
chancellor of the first social-democrat/liberal coalition in 1969, his new Ostpolitik – 
policy to the East - favored Wandel durch Annäherung – change through rapprochement 
and appeasement – with regard to the relations with the GDR. This new policy concept 
was more or less contradictory to the Hallstein doctrine and marked the end of its 
relevance in German foreign politics.  
 ‘Political and strategic’ interests continued to have a significant impact in the 
third phase of German Africa policy. It started in 1969 when the center-right government 
was replaced by a center-left, but ‘global order’ interests began to emerge as an 
additional motivation of the new government. According to Mair those are easier to 
preserve if 
 
the partners were peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, 
democratic and law-abiding. Global order interests aim at the creation of 
such conditions. That means that Germany has a great interest in 
promoting peace, human rights, democracy, rule of law, market 
economies and socio-economic development as well as in taking decisive 
action against military rule, dictatorships, warmongers, poverty and 
corruption. (Mair 2002, 14) 
 
 The single most influential topics for the 1970s in Mair’s definition were the 
promotion of peace and socio-economic development. The first decade of African 
independence was a disaster for the continent. With the end of colonialism the euphoria 
in and the expectations of African nations for their freshly gained independence were 
extremely high. After decades - in some cases centuries - of inequality and exploitation it 
was expected that national sovereignty would end the continent’s problems. That 
political independence did not necessarily mean the
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industrialized nations was a painful lesson most young African nations had to learn. The 
continent was in a mess and influential voices within the Brandt-government, mainly 
that of the BMZ-minister Erhard Eppler, called for more engagement in Africa based on 
humanitarian reasons and the needs of recipient countries. Eppler demanded foresighted 
and active development policies in the framework of global social and peace policy. He 
lost! His vision of ‘world interior policy’ reached the limits of financing and political 
will, partly because of successful lobbying by German industry which claimed to be 
under enormous international pressure. The budget of the BMZ was significantly 
reduced and Eppler resigned in 1974 (Engel 2000, 62-63).  
When both German states joined the United Nations in 1973, the East-West 
rivalry was restored. Although the FRG now officially accepted that other states could 
recognize the GDR, it still tried to pull potentially indecisive countries on board the 
American instead of the Soviet vessel of the Cold War. What counted was to get as 
many countries as possible supporting the Western side in international institutions, 
mainly the General Assembly of the United Nations (Engel 2000, 56).  
Nonetheless, even in the hot phase of the Cold War, when the United States and 
its western allies had a strong strategic interest in preventing Africa from falling to the 
Eastern Bloc, Germany still had  – contrary to America – some economic interests in 
Africa, mainly in the availability of resources. Shortly after the creation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the European Development Funds (EDF) were 
established and along with them the inclusion of Germany into European Africa politics. 
The social-democrat/liberal government of Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt pushed 
for the integration of German Africa policies into an European approach from 1974 
onwards (Engel 2000, 59).  
The development of common European Africa politics resulted in the Lomé 
Convention of 1975 between the European Community (EC) and ACP-countries (Africa, 
Caribbean, Pacific) with the aim of providing and regulating trade, development 
cooperation and political partnership. Trade regulations were very much in favor of the 
European countries as they ensured the flow of African agricultural and mineral 
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resources to Europe, but excluded customs exemption for African manufactured goods. 
The German interest in this convention was considerable. After enjoying the economic 
miracle of the 1960s the German economy now largely depended on exports and 
relatively easy access to resources. The oil crisis in 1973 painfully revealed this 
dependence on foreign resources. The Lomé Convention was seen as a means to tie 
resource-rich countries economically and politically to the European Community (Mair 
1999c). In Europe this dependence was stronger than it was in the United States, since 
the latter not only had a greater variety and quantity of resources, but also imported 
many non-fuel minerals from Canada and South America (Hahn and Cottrell 1976, 26-
27).  
The fourth phase of German Africa policy started in 1982 when the social-
democrat/liberal government of Helmut Schmidt ended with a motion of no confidence 
and was replaced by Helmut Kohl’s conservative/liberal coalition. Even though strategic 
interests considering East-West rivalry were still present, ‘global order’ interests 
increasingly determined German engagement in Africa. Those were mainly 
humanitarian reasons to abolish the Apartheid regime in South Africa and to assist 
Namibia on its way to independence. Relations with South Africa continuously 
challenged the policy makers of the Kohl administration because it needed to balance 
“diplomatic pressure from the EC’s majority, which wanted to impose mandatory 
economic sanctions on South Africa, on the one hand, and its own interest in unhindered 
relations with South Africa on the other” (Engel 2005, 111).  
Within the German government, this balancing act caused tensions between the 
AA and the BMZ. Hans-Dietrich Genscher retained his position as Foreign Minister 
because his party, the liberal FDP (Free Democratic Party), was part of the government 
under Schmidt as well as under Kohl. He continued his policy motivated by the 
promotion of human rights and liberation movements, and was therefore much more 
willing to support the EC’s call for sanctions against South Africa’s Apartheid-regime. 
The BMZ, however, was run by the conservative CSU (Christian Social Union). 
Paradoxically it was more concerned with maintaining unhindered relations with the 
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South African government and was, therefore, a lot more reluctant to impose sanctions 
than the AA. In the end, chancellor Helmut Kohl determined the policy more according 
to the AA’s concept and joined in multilateral sanctions by the EC against South Africa 
(Hofmeier 2002, 49-50). Kohl’s choice marks a clear upgrade of ‘global order interest’ 
based on moral considerations and a strong commitment to multilateralism as the 
foundation for the rule of international law and institutions.     
 
Changing Geopolitical Conditions in the 1990s and Germany’s Grand Strategy as a 
Civilian Power 
 
It used to be possible to ignore distant and misgoverned parts of the 
world. That is no longer so. In the world without borders, chaos is now 
our neighbour whether it is in Africa, Asia or in Afghanistan. (British 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 2001) 
 
The end of the Cold War meant not only major changes for Germany, but also for 
its relations to Africa. The long-term strategic interest that characterized the three 
decades before the fall of the Berlin wall to prevent Africa from falling to the Eastern 
bloc was no longer relevant. Even though the availability of African resources still 
played a role, Western countries ceased to have an interest in tying African nations to 
their side. This meant a relative weakening of African nations. During the Cold War they 
could play a tactical game, considering which side they would establish cooperation with 
and usually receiving considerable support from whichever side they chose. The end of 
the Soviet Union and the dominance of global capitalism made such tactical games 
impossible for the future. The communist experiment failed with the collapse of a 
terribly bankrupt Soviet Union.  
Rich Western nations knew that African countries could no longer count on 
Soviet support and would have to sell their resources to the highest bidders. Market 
forces instead of strategic interest increasingly dominated the flow of resources around 
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the globe. The bargaining position of African countries was significantly downgraded 
because the West did not need to worry anymore about them joining the Eastern bloc. 
Engel and Olsen correctly point out that the “disappearance of the bipolar contest for 
power and influence on the continent meant that Africa more or less lost what was left of 
its limited importance to global security” (Engel and Olsen 2005b, 7). Africa had no 
choice but to cooperate with Western nations if it wanted foreign aid and investments or 
to sell its commodities. Colonialism as the old form of African dependence was replaced 
by neo-colonialism as the new form, meaning economic dependence on core nations and 
corporations. The results were fundamental political changes. The West saw the chance 
to further spread democracy and Western values and therefore stopped supporting 
formerly loyal dictatorships or authoritarian regimes.  
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and German unification contributed largely 
to increased European integration. With the disappearance of the menace to the east and 
no need to stop the spread of Soviet influence in Africa, European integration became 
more and more important to German foreign policies. Instead of caring about 
development in Africa it was more important to take care of Eastern European countries 
that were suddenly knocking on the door of the European Community (Khadiagala 2000, 
84).  
The German disinterest in Africa at the beginning of the 1990s can thus be 
expressed very well by a simple cost-benefit calculation. The benefits of a rather intense 
engagement with Africa during the Cold War had been a secure flow of resources and a 
strategic stronghold against the Eastern Bloc. The latter was not relevant anymore after 
the Cold War ended and the costs of the former were radically reduced. On the domestic 
front, European integration became the focus of German foreign policies at the same 
time as the costs of engagement in Africa increased due to the difficult political situation 
there. More engagement with Africa was not, in any case, necessary because, despite all 
its problems, Africa still fulfilled the role of a periphery, supplying Germany with 
mineral and agricultural raw materials. It was simply not rational to increasing 
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engagement in Africa, since it would have meant increasing costs without increasing 
benefits.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War Germany therefore focused on 
reunification and European integration. The result for its Africa policies was a further 
retreat of active engagement and presence in Africa and an increase in the support of 
regional African initiatives for conflict resolution. Germany and other European 
countries tried to balance their withdrawal from Africa with increased rhetoric and 
assistance in the creation of independent African capacities and forces (Kühne 1999). A 
different way to say this is that Europeans did not want to bother with the mess on the 
African continent and bought their way out of direct involvement. However, this 
calculation changed significantly as soon as Germany realized there were other potential 
benefits of engagement on the African continent and that the costs of non-engagement 
were beginning to ratchet up. 
When the Red-Green government of Gerhard Schröder came to power in 1998 
with Joschka Fischer of the environmentalist-protest Green Party as Foreign Minister 
and Vice Chancellor, German Africa policy began to change. Germany entered a phase 
of increasing interest in Africa with an apparently serious intent to help the continent 
solve its problems and create better living standards for its impoverished population. The 
reasons for this new engagement are, however, less altruistic than they might seem at 
first glance. At one level attempts to help the African people are serious, however, not 
because Germany has developed into a selfless benefactor but because it has a vital self-
interest in generating sustained development on the world’s poorest continent. In today’s 
highly interlinked and interdependent world the situation in one part – even if it is the 
periphery – can easily develop dynamics that can have major effects on other parts of the 
world. This includes the security of core nations, especially if these two parts are located 
as close to each other as Europe and Africa.  
In 1998 the Red-Green government considered “development policies as global 
structural policies” in its first coalition agreement (SPD/Grüne 1998). It understands that 
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development policies can be used as a means to pursue broader geopolitical interests. 
Those interests are outlined by Mair who argues that  
 
Germany has an economic interest in accessible markets, in reliable 
trading partners with purchasing power; […] it has political and strategic 
interests in stable, peaceful and cooperative neighbors and also in the 
robust protection of its citizens at home and abroad if necessary, and […] 
it has an ecological interest in slowing down global warming, in 
preserving bio-diversity and in managing exhaustible resources. These 
direct and immediate interests are supplemented by a more abstract, 
indirect interest in establishing an international order favorable to 
immediate interests. In such a global order, decisive action to preserve 
immediate interests is needed less and less because the world’s players 
are peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-
abiding. Directly related to this interest in shaping global order conducive 
to civilian power is the interest in having like-minded and powerful 
partners or at least in influencing the action of powerful players on the 
world stage. (Mair 2002, 11) 
 
The interests dealt with in this section are first ecological, second economic, and 
third ‘global order’ combined with ‘political and strategic’ interests since the two 
overlap considerably.  
First, ecological interests: It is obvious that large-scale environmental problems 
such as global warming cannot be solved at the national level but must be treated in a 
global context. When the Green Party joined the government in 1998, Germany began to 
push this issue hard in international institutions. Africa’s abundance in ecosystems and 
in plant and animal species plays a key role in global ecological diversity and balance. 
Even though not as important as those of South America, Africa’s tropical rainforests 
have a major impact on the global climate and air pollution. Furthermore, the 
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preservation of African soils for agriculture is essential in order for Germany to maintain 
the import of agricultural goods from the region and to deal with the problem of food 
shortages in Africa. It is in Germany’s interest that Africa can feed as much of its own 
population as possible so that possible shortages based on natural catastrophes can be 
dealt with and balanced out locally before they become a major problem with broader 
political implications (Mair 1999, 2002).  
Second, economic interests: Sub-Saharan Africa has a population of 725 million 
people (UNFPA 2005) and, therefore, has the potential of becoming a market for 
German industrial products. This is not yet the case due to economic marginalization and 
high levels of poverty, but if this changes and Africa reaches economic relevance on the 
global stage it could be an important export market for Germany. However, even if 
Africa enjoys sustained economic growth over several years, it is unlikely that any 
manufactured goods it can produce will compete with German ones. Africa will 
probably remain in its peripheral economic role producing largely primary products, but 
as national incomes rise the demand for more sophisticated, products will also rise 
produced in the diversified economies of the core, will also rise.  
The availability of African resources remains a central concern in Germany’s 
economic interest in Africa. In the past decade precious minerals in particular gained 
importance. For example coltan which is necessary for the production of mobile phones 
and other high tech wireless devices (Mair 2002, 11-12).  As outlined above, with 
Germany in the core and Africa in the periphery of the world economy, the economic 
interest in cheap, secure, and continuous access to Africa’s resources has been the same 
ever since Germany acquired its first colonies in 1884: for cotton then read coltan now. 
However, African resources have never been totally irreplaceable and they are certainly 
not decisive for Germany’s economic wellbeing. With respect to German exports, Africa 
plays an even smaller role. From a peak of 6 percent in 1954, German exports to Africa 
have fallen to less than 2 percent of total exports in 2004 (Engel 2005, 121).  
Third, ‘global order’ and ‘political and strategic’ interests: Germany seeks to 
maintain and promote a civilianized international system (see Chapter III). This refers to 
  
37 
a global order based on Germany’s foreign policy identity as a civilian power and 
creates conditions favorable for a civilian power to operate effectively. Those ‘global 
order’ interests are the prime interest Germany has in Africa nowadays. They are rooted 
in Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power, which guides not only Germany’s 
interaction with Africa, but also its broader foreign policies. In fact, as we will see, 
despite the geopolitical changes described above, Africa only plays a minor role in 
German grand strategy. However, German grand strategy plays a major role in 
Germany’s Africa policies.  
In order to understand the current geopolitical interests of the Federal Republic 
of Germany it is essential to understand its ‘grand strategy’ as a civilian power. An exact 
definition of the term ‘grand strategy’ varies amongst scholars. In this paper it is 
understood as a concept which guides political behavior, especially foreign political 
behavior, of a given country for a long period of time. In Germany’s case grand strategy 
is based on the role concept of civilian power. Role concepts are theoretical conceptions 
used to explain the political behavior of a nation-state. The development of such foreign 
political role concepts is the result of self-perceptions as well as interaction, adaptation 
and conditioning of a society with its environment. Historical experience and 
socialization processes also play an important role in this context (Frenkler et al. 1997, 
19).  
With respect to Germany, the historical experience was World War II, the 
environment was the bipolar system of the Cold War, and the adaptation was the strong 
will to be integrated into the Western hemisphere alongside the United States of 
America. The experiences of World War II as well as the American strategy to rebuild 
Western Europe and create an international system of liberal capitalism were decisive 
for Germany to develop into a civilian power.  
Academically, the role concept ‘civilian power’ was first introduced by Hanns 
Maull in 1990. In practice, however, it has of course existed for some time before. Maull 
modeled his concept on the behavior of Germany and Japan during the Cold War. The 
concept is an ideal type that has never been fully met, neither by Germany nor Japan. It 
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is a theoretical framework intended to explain the foreign political behavior of countries 
such as Germany and Japan, resulting from the deficiency of existing theories of 
international relations to do so. This ideal type was not supposed to fit one specific 
example, but to test congruence between actual and ideal typical behavior of certain 
countries (Frenkler et al 1997, 21). The concept was not academically developed first 
and later adopted by countries to shape their foreign policies, it had been practiced by 
some countries, such as Germany, for a long time before Maull formalized the theory to 
explain their behavior (Kirste and Maull 1996, 297). 
A civilian power influences the international system through “the ability and 
intent to shape international relations in line with objectives. […] Civilian powers are, in 
other words, states which are willing and able to advance the civilianization of the 
international system” (Maull 1993, 126). The basic principles of the foreign policy 
identity of a civilian power are 
 
- The limitation of nationally organized use of force as a means to settle 
national or transnational conflicts 
- Rule of law and regulations in international relations 
- Intensification of multilateral cooperation and creation of participatory 
decision making processes for legitimizing an international system based on 
freedom, democracy and market economy 
- Promotion of social balance and fairness on a global level 
- Institution building to control and implement general norms and willingness 
to partial transfer of sovereignty  
- Special regulations and principals for the use of military force. (Kirste and 
Maull 1996, 300-301) 
 
During the Cold War, Germany successfully developed into a civilian power. 
The setting of the international system and the American strategy to rebuild Western 
Europe according to the Marshall plan laid the foundations for Germany to become a 
civilian power. The United States showed impressive commitment towards the 
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reconstruction of Europe, especially in Germany. American efforts for economic and 
political reconstruction in Europe were highly successful. Furthermore, the massive 
American military presence in Europe was in the interest of all countries involved. First, 
it was highly appreciated by Britain and France, which sought to be protected against the 
resurgence of another aggressive Germany. Second, it was the cornerstone for the 
success of American economic hegemony, which was threatened by the alternative 
international system embraced by the Soviet Union and that it had imposed onto Eastern 
Europe. Third, it was very much in the German interests because the United States 
basically paid Germany’s military and defense bills by protecting it from the Soviet 
menace. Meinig points out that “Western Europe was in effect an American 
protectorate” and that “it was clearly to Western Europe’s advantage to be able to focus 
on economic rehabilitation and political cooperation without the burdens or fears of 
heavy military development” (Meinig 2004, 356). Protected by the American military 
umbrella, Germany could focus on regaining economic strength and become part of the 
American world economy based on liberal capitalism.  
After World War II the United States created an international system based on 
international agreements, institutions, regimes, rule of law and free trade. The Bretton 
Woods Agreement, the United Nations, GATT, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), etc. were multilateral institutions, membership in which allowed Germany to 
re-integrate into the international community and to prove itself a reliable partner. 
Germany could focus on economic recovery without having to worry about military 
threats, because the United States took care of that. The economic recovery showed 
impressive pace, not surprisingly because when one starts at zero after complete 
destruction, profit margins are enormous. The know-how for industrial production was 
present in Germany, as were land and labor, and capital was to a large extent provided 
by the United States. Germany quickly returned to its former role as a major exporter of 
high quality manufactured goods and, due to the fixed exchange rate, German products 
were cheap on the world market. The liberal world order based on American hegemony 
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allowed Germany to take full advantage of that and export its goods all over the 
American sphere of influence.  
Especially economically Germany very soon became a central part of the 
American-run international system based on liberal capitalism, which Germany needed 
to thrive economically. There was no way for the war-torn German population to create 
sufficient domestic demand for such an economic boom. It was exports that boosted 
Germany’s economy as well as the security America guaranteed with respect to the 
national integrity of Germany and the free flow of commodities around the world, be it 
German industrial goods for export, or raw materials and resources for imports. The 
inclusion of Germany was in the interests of all partners involved. For Germany it 
guaranteed both access to markets and a legitimate voice in the international community, 
which it had lost after World War II. For other countries, especially France, it was a 
safeguard to have Germany under control in case there were signs of increasing 
aggressiveness as had been the case three times since 1870.  
In a nutshell, the political settings in Europe and the American world order from 
the 1950s on clearly favored Germany acting in a multilateral context, abiding by the 
rule of law and transferring sovereignty in favor of supranational institutions. In fact, the 
commitment to supranational integration was easier for Germany than it was for other 
European countries. Germany regained its formal sovereignty over foreign political 
affairs only in 1955. With no sovereignty, it was no big commitment to agree to have 
sovereignty handed back tied into a supranational context. Considering Germany’s 
central position in Europe, it was clear that Germany would have a significant say in the 
setting of this supranational context, which would start with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951 and eventually move into the European Union (EU) in 
1992. These supranational settings were no loss of sovereignty for Germany after the 
war, they rather were a way to regain it.  
As argued above, the development of Germany towards a civilian power was 
clearly in the interest of the Allies as well as in the interest of the German political and 
economic elites. However, it was also very much in the interest of the ordinary 
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population. The German people were tired of war; after more than a decade of 
totalitarian Nazi-rule and rough years in the immediate aftermath of the war, 
expectations were low and willingness to work hard for a decent life in peace was high. 
After Germany had realized what horrendous suffering it had caused on the European 
continent under Nazi-leadership, in the following decades a ‘never again’ mentality with 
respect to militarism and nationalism became thoroughly entrenched in the society.  
The rejection of a German Sonderweg – ‘do it alone policies’ – and the political 
directive of Konrad Adenauer of ‘Westintegration’ – full integration into the 
international system under American leadership – was broadly supported by the German 
population. International institution building, binding international laws and 
supranational integration became accepted as an integral part of the integration into that 
system (Maull 2004, 90-92). When the economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s 
revealed the enormous benefits of the American world order to the German population, 
Germany’s role in this system became internalized by the people. In this regard the 
current third period of German geopolitical development is remarkably like the first one 
preceding World War I. Its strength is its complete support throughout German society, 
from the masses through the political and economic elites.  
To sum up, the character of the Federal Republic of Germany as a civilian actor 
in today’s international system is the result of three factors. First, the agenda of the 
Allies, especially the United States, as to what direction Germany ought to take in future. 
Second, the strong commitment of the German leadership to become part of the 
international system under American hegemony. Third, the lesson learnt from the 
destruction of World War II that this was in fact the only way for Germany to thrive and 
become a respected partner in the international system. This was as much the desire of 
the ordinary population as it was the desire of the elites.  
After acting according to those civilian power principles for more than 50 years, 
a civilianized international system is the only way Germany can exist and prosper at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Such a civilianized international system is similar to the 
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‘hegemony’ type of geopolitical system Agnew and Corbridge propose in their 1995 
work Mastering Spaces. Agnew and Corbridge suggest a type of hegemony which is  
 
exercised increasingly through international institutions and by a growing 
transnational class of business people and bureaucrats. […] In this 
construction, hegemony has become increasingly reliant on soft power – 
the active assent to and agreement with international standards of conduct 
governing economic and political transactions. (Agnew 2003, 878-879) 
 
For Germany as a typical trading state transnationalism and reliable international 
standards are essential for its prosperity. Germany needs such international networks and 
the free flow of commodities. It is the world’s largest exporter, accounting for 10 percent 
of the world’s exports (CIA 2005). Deutsche Post is the world’s biggest logistics and 
freight corporation, and with DHL and Deutsche Bahn there are two more German 
companies amongst the world’s top five logistics corporations (Plunkett 2006). Germany 
needs global interdependencies and the environment described above in order to operate 
the way it does. It depends on a free, integrated world economy and a system that 
ensures free trade through international regulations, laws, norms and institutions. A 
precondition for such a system to work is that the countries in it are “peaceful and 
civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding” (Mair 2002, 11). 
Therefore, Germany’s prime interests in Africa are ‘global order’ interests, which aim at 
creating such conditions in African countries and thus are the major underlying 
motivation for German Africa policies.  
 
Summary 
 
Germany imperialism before World War I sought to create a large empire in 
central Africa, a German Mittelafrika.  The ambition to become a leading colonial power 
was rooted in the desire to secure resources and gain prestige in the increasing 
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competition of great powers preceding World War I. Germany’s geopolitical ambitions 
peaked during the Nazi-period, however, the interest in Africa at that time was limited to 
a general rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, which had ended German colonialism. 
The efforts to reclaim former colonies remained very low and were always superseded 
by more immediate interests in Eurasia. 
During the Cold War there were four phases of German Africa policy, motivated 
by a variety of interests. In the 1950s the young German nation had hardly any interest in 
Africa. The second phase in the 1960s was strongly motivated by ‘political and strategic’ 
interests caused by overall policies of the Cold War. Those were still dominant during 
the 1970s, however, this period also saw an increase of ‘global order interests’ motivated 
by peace policy and humanitarian concerns. In the last decade before reunification this 
trend intensified, but was accompanied by a stronger integration into multilateral 
institutions and a focus on Southern Africa. Besides those interests, economic interests 
existed throughout the entire 40 years. They were never dominating and, due to the 
minor role African countries play in the global economy, relatively marginal for the 
design of German Africa policies, but they were certainly present and part of German-
African relations.  
After reunification, the German interest in Africa first significantly decreased 
because of internal and European integration. However, in an increasingly interlinked 
and interdependent world, Africa moved higher on the political agenda of most Western 
countries in the late 1990. Germany is now more interested in Africa than ten years ago 
because it has realized the relevance of Africa for its broader foreign political interest. 
Those are rooted in Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power. This grand strategy 
favors a civilianized international system characterized by multilateralism, supranational 
integration, strong international institutions, rule of law, free trade, human rights, good 
governance and restrictions on the use of force. Germany depends on the functioning of 
such a system because otherwise it can not exercise significant influence on global 
politics. Its prime interest in Africa after the Cold War has been to promote such a 
civilianized international system and to include as many African countries as possible. 
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CHAPTER III 
HIV/AIDS AND STATE FAILURE IN AFRICA 
 
The previous chapter has shown how Germany’s interest in Africa evolved 
during the 20th century and that Germany’s prime geopolitical interest nowadays is the 
promotion of a civilianized international system. This chapter argues that the problem of 
state failure in Africa, exacerbated by HIV/AIDS, is in fundamental contrast to such a 
civilianized international system and, therefore, of central concern to German Africa 
policies.  
 
Africa and Kenya in the Global Context of the Pandemic 
 
After the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) was first detected in the 
early 1980s, the disease has spread with incredible speed and devastating impact through 
sub-Saharan Africa and, to a much lesser extent, throughout the rest of the world. Based 
on the acquisition of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), AIDS depletes the 
human immune system, so that opportunistic infections which would not pose a danger 
to healthy people can become life-threatening to individuals infected with AIDS (NIAID 
2005). The most common mode of transmission of the virus is sexual encounter, 
however, also mother-to-child and direct blood transmission, mainly through the sharing 
of needles by intravenous drug users, are routes through which the virus spreads (WHO 
1998). Even though in recent years there has been substantial progress in the 
development of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which improve and prolong the lives of 
people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), there is no known cure for the disease. As 
many scholars have argued, the spread of AIDS is closely related to bad socio-economic 
conditions as well as times of war and social unrest (Kalipeni et al. 2004; Patterson 
2005; Hope 1999; Elbe 2003; Price-Smith 2002). Considering this and that the virus first 
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emerged in central Africa1, it is not surprising that the hardest hit region in the world by 
2005 was sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, as table 2 and figure 2 show it is far more affected 
than any other part of the globe.  
 
Table 2: Selected AIDS characteristics for the world and sub-Saharan Africa in 
2005 
  
Population   
millions   
People living 
with HIV/AIDS 
Millions 
AIDS 
deaths 
millions 
New 
Infections 
millions 
Adult 
Prevalence 
 % 
Global   6,464.7 
40.3                          
(36.7 - 45.4) 
3.1                         
(2.8 - 3.6) 
4.9                         
(4.3 - 6.6) 
1.1                  
(1.0 - 1.3) 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa  725.0 
25.8                 
(23.8 - 28.9) 
2.4                          
(2.1 - 2.7) 
3.2                   
(2.8 - 3.9) 
7.2                           
(6.6 - 8.0) 
Source: UNFPA 2005, UNAIDS 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Selected AIDS characteristics for the world and sub-Saharan Africa. Source: 
UNFPA 2005, UNAIDS 2005 
                                                 
1
 McNeil argues that the first confirmed case of infection of HIV was found in a blood sample of an 
African man from the Belgian Congo from 1959, but that the killer virus most likely came into existence 
as early as the late 1940s or early 1950s (McNeil, 1998) 
(c) AIDS deaths 2005 (global 3.1 million)
rest of the 
world,           
0.7 milion
sub-Saharan 
Africa,           
2.4 million
(c) New Infections 2005 (global 4.9 million)
sub-Saharan 
Africa,        
3.2 million
rest of the 
world,        
1.7 million
(a) Population 2005 (global 6,464.7 million)
sub-Saharan 
Africa,           
725 million
rest of the 
world,      
5739.7 million
(b) People with HIV 2005 (global 40.3 million)
rest of the 
w orld,      
14.5 million
sub-Saharan 
Africa,      
25.8 million
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Only slightly over 10 percent of the global population lives in sub-Saharan 
Africa, however, the region is home to almost two thirds of all PLWHA. In 2005, almost 
two and a half million people died of the consequences of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and more than three million became infected in the same year. The average prevalence 
rate for adults aged 15 to 49 in the region is almost seven times the global average. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of prevalence rates around the globe. According 
to UNAIDS, no developed country has AIDS-prevalence rates higher than 1%. Even in 
the developing world, with the exception of Haiti (5.6%), no country outside Africa has 
rates of more than 3%, but in sub-Saharan Africa prevalence rates go up to almost 40%. 
Currently the most affected country is Botswana with an estimated prevalence rate of 
37.3 % (UNAIDS 2004a) 
 
 
Figure 3: Adult HIV prevalence in % in 2003. Source: UNAIDS 2004a 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the pandemic spread across sub-Saharan Africa over the 
past two decades. In 1988 only Uganda and to a lesser extent Rwanda and Burundi were 
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seriously affected. By 2003 almost every country in Eastern and Southern Africa and 
also many countries in Western Africa had prevalence rates of more than 5 %. 
 
 
Figure 4: The spread of HIV in Africa 1988-2003. Source: UNAIDS 2004a 
 
No doubt, the quality of the data is more than questionable. At the onset of 
AIDS, most countries were far from having effective surveillance of prevalence rates. It 
might well be possible that prevalence rates in many countries were similar and the 
differences in the official data occur simply because some countries engaged in more 
active and efficient data acquisition.  
Even though almost all the data used in this chapter is taken from UNAIDS, the 
quality must still be questioned. Although UNAIDS is a serious data source, the agency 
has to rely on national monitoring institutions of the individual countries for its data. 
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa use sentinel surveillance to identify their 
prevalence rates. This method anonymously tests pregnant women attending ante-natal 
clinics without their knowledge. Although sentinel surveillance gives an approximate 
estimation of real prevalence rates it causes several serious statistical flaws. First, only 
pregnant women who attend the clinics get tested. In Kenya, for example, only 71 
percent of pregnant women attended antenatal clinics which are part of the national 
sentinel surveillance system. The 2003 Kenya National Demographic and Health Survey 
(KDHS) also shows that pregnant women in rural areas or with low education levels are 
less likely to receive antenatal care than pregnant women in urban areas or with higher 
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education levels (CBS 2004, 124). Second, no data from this source is available on 
prevalence rates of men. Since women in general are more vulnerable to HIV, omission 
of men will distort the results. However, the data seems to be reliable enough to identify 
general trends of rapidly increasing HIV prevalence in most countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa up to approximately 2000. 
This trend is further supported by looking at the number of people dying of the 
consequences of AIDS and the number of new infections. The data for AIDS-deaths 
seems to be most reliable, since it is taken from absolute numbers, not estimates. As 
Figure 5 shows, the number of AIDS-deaths increased dramatically from 1988 to 1998. 
In 1998 more than eight times as many people died of the consequences of AIDS than in 
1988. In the late 1990s, however, the increase in the numbers of AIDS-deaths began to 
slow, most likely because of the effects of AIDS programs of African countries.  
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Figure 5: AIDS deaths in sub-Saharan Africa in millions 1988-2005. Source:  
Fleshman 2001; UNAIDS 2004a, 2005 
 
Furthermore, there are other signs which indicate that in recent years the pace 
with which the pandemic spreads has been slowed from a peak around the turn of the 
millennium.  
Figure 6 shows that adult prevalence rates across sub-Saharan Africa dropped 
from a peak of 9.0% in 2001 to 7.2% in 2005. Even more significant is the continuous 
reduction of new infections since the late 1990s. Despite ongoing high fertility rates and 
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substantial population growth in the region, the absolute number of new infections 
decreased from an estimated 4 million in 1999 to 3.1m and 3.2m in 2004 and 2005 
respectively.   
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Figure 6: New infections and adult prevalence rates in sub-Saharan Africa 1999-
2005. Source: UNAIDS 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004a, 
2004b, 2005 
 
Nonetheless, despite these slight signs of hope in recent years, the extent to 
which the pandemic has hit - and continues to hit - sub-Saharan Africa, is unmatched in 
any other part of the world. The second most affected region in the world, the Caribbean, 
has managed to stabilize its adult HIV prevalence at 1.6% and to avert increasing 
numbers of new infections (UNAIDS 2005). However, in other regions, such as Eastern 
Europe, India, Central and Southeast Asia, the numbers of PLWHA is rising rapidly 
(UNAIDS 2005, 3).  
Figure 4 shows that initially Eastern and Southern Africa had the highest HIV 
prevalence rates. In Eastern Africa, where the virus supposedly had its origins, it has not 
spread to the same extent as in the southern part of the continent. Early and active 
policies of the region’s governments and behavioral change by the population have 
helped prevent new infections and fight the spread of the virus. The most notable 
example is Uganda, where the estimated rates dropped from over 15% in the early 1990s 
to around 6.5% by the end of 2003. In general, Eastern Africa has showed a slow, but 
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steady decline of prevalence rates over the past years, whereas the rates are still rising in 
Southern Africa, with the exception of Zimbabwe. Prevalence in Western Africa, which 
has traditionally been less affected than the eastern and southern part of the continent, 
has remained more or less stable at slightly below the rates for Eastern Africa (UNAIDS 
2005).  
The general trend of declining prevalence rates in Eastern Africa is mirrored in 
Kenya. In fact, the most recent UNAIDS AIDS epidemic update outlines Kenya next to 
Uganda as an example of a country effectively fighting the pandemic. The report argues 
that “This is only the second time in more than two decades that a sustained decline in 
national HIV infection levels has been seen in a sub-Saharan African country. The most 
dramatic drops in prevalence have been among pregnant women in urban Kenya” 
(UNAIDS 2005, 27). Figure 7 illustrates that adult prevalence in Kenya was more than 
halved from a peak of 15.8% in 1999 to 7.4% in 2004.  
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Figure 7: Adult HIV prevalence in Kenya 1990-2004 (sentinel surveillance). 
Source: NACC 2005 
 
Considering this, Kenya certainly represents success in fighting the virus. In 
1999, the National Aids Control Council (NACC) was established with the support of 
the World Bank in order to coordinate the various sectors and to expand the fight against 
AIDS from the health sector to all sectors of society. It was clearly realized that 
HIV/AIDS was not only a health issue, but that the pandemic has major implications for 
all parts of state and society. The NACC is the central agency of the Kenyan government 
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for monitoring, evaluating and coordinating the efforts to fight AIDS of the private 
sector, and the Ministries of Planning, Health, Agriculture and Education (Author 
Interview with Cheluget). Merely looking at the decline of prevalence rates since 1999, 
it seems to have worked very efficiently. However, other factors are clearly also at work: 
increased awareness within the population; behavioral change; and previous policies 
have all caused the rates to drop. With the election of Mwai Kibaki as president in 
December 2002, the fight against HIV/AIDS became prioritized at the highest level of 
the state. The role of the NACC as the central agency was reinforced and President 
Kibaki made it a personal priority to get the problem under control.  
Kibaki’s role was central. He required everyone in his government to make the 
defeat of HIV/AIDS their number one priority. A very broad campaign was formed to 
create awareness, reduce stigmatization and to discourage risky behavior. The most 
prominent figures of the country such as President Kibaki and his wife Mama Lucy 
Kibaki, all ministers, the national football team, which enjoys extraordinarily high social 
status, and many others joined in extensive promotion initiatives to popularize the four 
catch phrases of the NACC: 1. Abstain; 2. Be Faithful; 3. Use a condom; 4. Know your 
status. It is not possible to identify exactly which factors had the most impact on the 
reduction of the prevalence rate, however, from looking at the data it has obviously been 
a successful campaign.  
The data shown for Kenya in figure 7 is an unweighted average based on sentinel 
surveillance in 42 ante-natal clinics around the country. Looking at the data, some 
antenatal clinics show enormous variations of prevalence rates in certain surveillance 
sites. It is highly unlikely that such high variations would occur in the actual prevalence 
rates of the area. For example, Thika District Hospital in Kenya’s Central Province 
reports a drop in the prevalence rate from 39% in 1994 to 12% in 1996 and a rise back 
up to 31% in 1998 (NACC 2005). Although it is possible that such changes might have 
occurred for the women tested in these four years, it is highly unlikely that these changes 
would occur in the overall prevalence rate of the area. Being aware of the flaws of 
sentinel surveillance, the KDHS has begun to use population based surveys using 
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statistical sampling methods to identify prevalence rates. The sample size for the test in 
2003 was 3,151 women and 2,851 men (6001 total) from the eight provinces of Kenya. 
The results are shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Adult HIV prevalence in Kenya 2003 (population based survey). 
Source: CBS 2004, 222 
 
For the first time, social, demographic, and behavioral factors were taken into 
account to achieve more precision by choosing a sample which is as representative for 
the entire population as possible. Compared to the sentinel surveillance, the data of the 
KDHS reveals two significant aspects. First, the overall rate based on sentinel 
surveillance for 2003 was 9.8 percent; significantly higher than the 6.7 percent according 
to the KDHS for the same year. Second, the rate for women is almost double the rate for 
men. Considering the fact that men have a lower prevalence rate than women it is not 
surprising that the results of population based survey, which includes men, are notably 
lower than the ones of the sentinel surveillance, which does not include men. However, 
even the rate for women (8.7 percent) in the KDHS is lower than the rate calculated 
using sentinel surveillance (9.8 percent). The reason for this might be that the KDHS 
uses sampled data which is supposed to represent the entire population, whereas sentinel 
surveillance is restricted to pregnant women, who - for obvious reasons - are part of the 
sexually active population, which has a higher vulnerability than the sexually non-active 
population.  
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Impacts of HIV/AIDS on State and Society 
 
For the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS is not just a humanitarian 
crisis. It is a security crisis -- because it threatens not just individual 
citizens, but the very institutions that define and defend the character of 
a society. This disease weakens workforces and saps economic strength. 
AIDS strikes at teachers, and denies education to their students. It 
strikes at the military, and subverts the forces of order and 
peacekeeping. […] AIDS is one of the most devastating threats ever to 
confront the world community. Many have called the battle against it a 
sacred crusade. The United Nations was created to stop wars. Now, we 
must wage and win a great and peaceful war of our time -- the war 
against AIDS. (US Vice President Al Gore 2000) 
 
Considering the dimension of the disease in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to 
look at the effect the disease has on social, economic and political life on the continent. 
From a historical epidemiological perspective, HIV/AIDS is a very young phenomenon. 
Therefore, this section will examine the effects of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the context of other epidemics and pandemics. There is extensive research by such well-
known scholars as William H. McNeill and Jared Diamond on the immense role of 
infectious disease on the development of states and societies (McNeill 1963 and 1976; 
Diamond 1997). As figure 9 shows, HIV/AIDS is by far the leading cause of death in 
Africa. On average it is estimated that the disease kills ten times more people on the 
continent than all the armed conflicts combined (Thurman 2001, 192; Elbe 2002, 174). 
Taking into account that HIV/AIDS causes several million deaths each year in 
sub-Saharan Africa, it certainly needs to be treated in the context of past disastrous 
diseases such as the bubonic plague, the Black Death, the Spanish flu, etc. What makes 
AIDS even more severe is that it takes the most productive part out of the population. 
Contrary to its pandemic predecessors, it is not the elderly, the children, the weak, or the 
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poor who are affected most. It is the sexually active part of the population, young adults, 
who are affected most. This is the part of the population every country depends on most. 
Nelson Mandela argued that 
  
AIDS kills those on whom society relies to grow the crops, work in the 
mines and factories, run the schools and hospitals and govern nations 
and countries, thus increasing the number of dependent persons. It 
creates new pockets of poverty when parents and breadwinners die and 
children leave school earlier to support the remaining children. (Quoted 
in Price-Smith 2002, 91) 
 
 
 Figure 9: Leading causes of death in Africa 2000. Source: WHO 2001 
 
Several studies have shown that there is no significant difference among victims 
between social classes or levels of education (Patterson and Cieminis 2005; Hope 1999; 
CBS 2004; Price-Smith 2002, Elbe 2003). AIDS has severe impacts on all spheres of 
social structure, economic growth, and development of a country. Progress in a country’s 
development is not exclusively measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) anymore. 
Other indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI) include life expectancy 
and education levels, and express the real dimension of the pandemic for developing 
countries better than the GDP. In almost every sub-Saharan African country, life 
expectancy has been heavily reduced due to HIV/AIDS. Figure 10 illustrates that, even 
though countries classified by the UN as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) show a 
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slight increase in life expectancy from 49.4 years in 1987 to 51.1 years in 2003, 
countries with high AIDS rates show just the opposite trend. In Botswana, the hardest hit 
country, life expectancy at birth dropped from 60.8 years to 38.0 years for the same time 
period. In Kenya the situation is similar, life expectancy decreased from 57.6 years to 
45.4 years.  
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Figure 10: Life expectancy at birth 1987-2003. Source: World Bank 2005 
 
The U.S. Census Bureau has published a study which compares actual 2002 
growth rates and life expectancies of various countries with estimates for those factors if 
there would be no AIDS. Figure 11 shows the results for life expectancies in Botswana 
and Kenya for 2002 and the estimates for 2010.  
It is obvious how dramatically the pandemic affects life expectancy. As 
mentioned above, AIDS kills young adults, who are not only the most important part of 
the population for the economy, but also for private family life. In many countries they 
traditionally care for elderly relatives as well as raise and educate their children. It is not 
exactly clear what this will mean for society as a whole, 
 
but there is one certainty: a small number of young adults – the group 
that has traditionally provided care for both children and the elderly – 
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will have to support large numbers of young and old people. Many of 
these young adults will themselves be debilitated by AIDS and may 
even require care from their children or elderly parents rather than 
providing it. (UNAIDS 2000a, 23) 
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Figure 11: Life Expectancy in Botswana and Kenya for 2002 and 2010. Source: USCB 
2004 
 
Such a distortion in the demography has profound impacts on the economy. In 
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture is the core sector of the economy, but 
in many cases there is still no security of food supply for the population. In an 
increasingly globalized and neo-liberal world-economy, the only sector where African 
countries have a slight chance to compete is labor-intensive agriculture. Such production 
is severely threatened by the increasing lack of productive labor caused by high HIV 
prevalence. The pandemic causes a shortage of young adults to produce food, and puts 
additional constraints on the left-over population to care for the sick. The result is not 
only a reduced inflow of foreign currency in the case of cash crops, but also internal 
food insecurity. In such cases, when the risk of starvation increases, the potential for 
state failure also increases, thus demanding additional external aid and engagement.  
The problem commonly identified as the single biggest dilemma caused by 
HIV/AIDS, is the high number of orphans (Gosh and Kalipeni 2004; Hope 1999; Brown 
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2004; Author interviews with Cheluget; Kalweo; Kiarie; and Wainaina). In 1997, 
USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood predicted that eventually a third of the 
population under 15 will be orphans in some countries. He warned of a “lost generation 
– a sea of youth who are disadvantaged, vulnerable, undereducated and lacking both 
hope and opportunity” (Atwood 1997). At the end of 2003, there were approximately 
12.1 million orphans due to AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2004a). These 
children usually grow up with grandparents, friends or without any guardian. Either way, 
it is less likely that they receive an education equal to growing up in stable family 
conditions. It is no exaggeration to argue that “orphans constitute one of the worst 
catastrophes faced by sub-Saharan African countries as millions of children lose one 
parent or both to AIDS” (Ghosh and Kalipeni 2004, 304).  
Many orphans have no choice but to drop out of school and join the labor force 
in order to survive. This has devastating short-term and long term impacts on the 
economy, because the quality and the productivity of the labor force is reduced. If 
relatively highly skilled workers die of the consequences of HIV/AIDS and are replaced 
by inexperienced children, productivity is reduced in the short-term. In the long term it is 
reduced because high numbers of children dropping out of school destroys future human 
capital. These orphans will not receive the education necessary to become a highly 
skilled and productive part of the work force. It shows how the demand for education is 
reduced in societies with large numbers of AIDS-orphans.  
The consequences of large numbers of orphans on the supply side are even more 
severe. It is bad enough when an orphan drops out of school to make a living, but if a 
teacher dies, the consequences are a lot more severe. Schoolchildren are stuck without 
their teacher and are no longer educated. In addition, teachers represent highly skilled 
human capital, it takes awhile to train them; they are not easily replaced (Wobst and 
Arndt 2004, 1835).  
The destruction of human capital at all levels is precisely what makes AIDS so 
devastating. First, it destroys current human capital by killing large parts of the work 
force, including the highly skilled components of society that are extremely hard to 
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replace, especially in countries with ramshackle education systems. Second, it destroys 
future human capital by forcing high numbers of orphans into the work force, depriving 
them of education and diminishing or destroying future opportunities and perspectives.  
In the U.S., the National Intelligence Council predicts a reduction of economic 
growth of up to 1 percent of GDP due to AIDS for the hardest-hit countries (NIC 2000, 
25). Brown argues that in some sub-Saharan African countries, AIDS might decrease the 
annual GDP growth as much as 1.4 percent (Brown 2004, 300). All these numbers are 
estimates and vary from study to study, however, considering that during the 1990s GDP 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 2.2 percent (World Bank 2005), a drop of 1 or 
even 1.4 percent expresses a significant decline.  
The problems outlined above can lead to situations where a disrupted social 
structure and poor economic performance undermine state capacity and causes major 
problems for national governments and the international system. A major part of the 
statistical evidence for this claim is taken from Price-Smith’s 2002 study, which 
examines the impact of infectious disease on state capacity. The analysis looks at 
infectious disease in general, not only at AIDS. The proxies used are infant mortality 
(IM) and life expectance (LX), not the HIV prevalence rate. Nonetheless, the results 
provide a helpful illustration how a pandemic such as HIV/AIDS influences state 
capacity. Price-Smith defines state capacity as  
 
the capability of government […] its level determines the state’s ability to 
satisfy its most important needs: survival, protection of its citizens from 
physical harm as a result of internal and external predation, economic 
prosperity and stability, effective governance, territorial integrity, power 
projection, and ideological projection. State capacity includes the concept 
that states are entities that evolve over time. This evolution occurs 
because of the changing factors that affect state power: land, resources, 
population, health, technology, human capital, prosperity and so on. 
(Price-Smith 2002, 25-26) 
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Table 3 shows the attributes considered by Price-Smith to be decisive for state 
capacity ranked in order of decreasing importance, and the statistical indicators 
expressing those attributes  
 
Table 3: Attributes and statistical indicators for state capacity 
Attributes for State Capacity Statistical Indicator
human capital
resilience
autonomy
instrumental rationality
Military Spending per soldier (standardized 
currency, per capita)
fiscal resources
reach and responsiveness
legitimacy
coherence
Gross National Product (current prices, 1980 US 
dollars, per capita)
Secondary School Enrollment
Government Expenditure (standardized 
currency, per capita)
Net long-term capital inflow (standardized 
currency, per capita)
 
Source: Price Smith 2002, 26-28 
 
Price-Smith analyzes five statistical indicators from 1950 to 1990 for 20 
countries. As shown in table 3 those indicators are GNP, government expenditure, 
military spending, secondary school enrollment, net long-term capital inflow. The 
proxies used to express the level of infectious diseases are infant mortality and life 
expectancy. He calculated the correlation between each of the indicators and the two 
proxies. State capacity is an aggregate of those indicators, thus, Price-Smith also 
calculated the correlation between state capacity and the proxies. The results are shown 
in figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Correlation between statistical indicators and infectious disease proxies. 
Source: Price-Smith 2002, 51-63 
 
It becomes obvious that for all indicators, except for capital inflow, there is a 
strong or very strong positive correlation with life expectancy. This means that as life 
expectancy increases there is a statistical correlation of 0.639 that state capacity also 
increases. Similarly strong is the negative correlation for infant mortality. Again for all 
indicators except capital inflow, there is a strong or very strong negative correlation with 
infant mortality. This shows that as infant mortality decreases, state capacity would 
increase with a statistical correlation of 0.629. Considering that low life expectancy and 
high infant mortality were the proxies to express high levels of infectious diseases in a 
country, these correlations demonstrate that as levels of infectious disease increase, state 
capacity decreases.  
 There is, however, no statistical analysis of how closely state capacity and state 
failure are linked. King and Zeng define state failure as “the complete or partial collapse 
of state authority, such as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. Failed states have 
governments with little political authority or ability to impose the rule of law” (King and 
Zeng 2001, 623). Using this definition for state failure, one would expect a very strong 
negative correlation with state capacity. Therefore, we can infer that high levels of 
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infectious diseases contribute to creating conditions favorable to state failure. If state 
capacity is undermined, state failure becomes more likely. Price-Smith argues that 
 
as state capacity declines, and as pathogen-induced deprivation and 
increasing demands upon the state increase, we may see an attendant 
increase in the incidence of chronic sub-state violence and state failure. 
(Price-Smith 2002, 14-15) 
 
The disruption of family structures and educational systems through HIV/AIDS 
leaves children with less or even no paternal guidance and protection, and academic 
education. For many orphans it destroys future prospects because at a very young age 
they are forced into making a living in poverty-ridden Africa countries. Orphaned or 
despairing children without any hope for the future are much more likely to engage in 
risky behavior than someone who grew up in a stable family and social conditions. For 
girls this usually means a life of prostitution, for boys it can mean any type of illegal 
activity such as drug trafficking, robbery, or joining a military group, raiding gang, or 
terrorist organization. Child soldiers and desperate people are a major threat to security, 
simply because they do not have anything to lose and are easy recruits for terror 
organizations.  
 
Children orphaned by AIDS will have no role models in the future and 
they will resort to crime to survive. […] Militias and organised bands can 
thus provide an attractive combination of shelter, food and self-esteem for 
young people with unstable social backgrounds and few education and 
employment prospects. (Elbe 2003, 53) 
 
This can result in a short-term life span mentality, which creates a mindset of 
lawlessness and lack of respect for social or ethical norms caused by the belief that one 
will not live long enough to face the consequences or be punished for such behavior. 
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Elbe calls HIV/AIDS a “politically destabilizing force” (Elbe 2003, 8) as he outlines the 
impact of the disease on militaries and security forces. Using Price-Smith’s concept of 
state capacity it is essential for the state to be in a position where it can exercise power 
and ensure security for its population by having the potential to fight internal and 
external threats. This is not possible if the military and security apparatus is not 
effectively deployable due to high AIDS rates. Elbe argues that in heavily war-torn 
countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Angola, up to 60 
percent of the military might be HIV positive (Elbe 2003, 29).  
Kenya’s most important daily newspaper reported in 2000 that AIDS accounted 
for 75 percent of all police officer deaths (Daily Nation 2000). Being a police officer in 
Kenya is not a safe job in the first place, but that three quarters of police officer deaths 
are caused by AIDS shows a devastating impact on the security forces. The reasons for 
such high death rates among soldiers and police are not exactly clear. It may well be 
related to the spatial mobility of such groups. Militaries are highly mobile, being away 
from home often for several weeks or months. During those periods many soldiers 
engage in commercial or casual sex. The numerous wars and conflicts in Africa create a 
situation of lawlessness in many parts of the continent and increase poverty and risky 
behavior: rape and violations are common practices in such situations. This favors the 
spread of AIDS, resulting in an even more traumatized civil society and even less 
effective security forces. The military and police become ineffective because high 
numbers of security personnel dying of AIDS can not be easily replaced. Military forces 
need more recruits, need to replace the higher ranked staff with less qualified officers 
and need to deal with their sick members. In many cases militaries can not fully perform 
their duties.  
It is hard enough for an African government to get the military to follow its 
orders and accept executive commands in the first place. However, if in addition to those 
problems military forces are not effectively deployable because of prevailing diseases, 
governments are stuck without a power projection apparatus. This not only affects the 
maintenance of internal order, but also peacekeeping operations in neighboring 
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countries. With respect to peacekeeping operations there are several severe problems. 
First, peacekeepers can act as vectors of HIV and spread or contract the virus into or 
from the areas they are deployed. Second, a country might be unwilling to contribute to 
peacekeeping operation because it fears that large numbers of its military personnel may 
become infected with HIV. Third, a country might be unwilling to host peacekeeping 
operations because it fears that the peacekeepers will spread HIV throughout the country 
(Elbe 2003, 39). This creates a vicious cycle. Peacekeepers are needed in unstable, 
fragile areas for the maintenance of order and the creation of a framework in which state 
and society can develop.  
As outlined above it is precisely those conditions: poverty, instability, 
lawlessness, lack of future prospects, which promote risky behavior and, therefore, 
contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS. If peacekeeping missions are in danger because 
of the problems caused by HIV/AIDS, the situation in fragile areas is likely to become 
worse and worse. The two major problems in the vicious cycle are warfare and 
HIV/AIDS. Both are mutually reinforcing and if one is removed, the other one will be 
easier to fight. Elbe argues that  
 
the growing influence of HIV/AIDS in conflicts in Africa may present the 
same stark choice that Western Europe faced half a century ago, albeit for 
different reasons: Abolish war as an instrument for addressing political 
differences or gradually be abolished yourself. Whatever the short-term 
gains produced by armed conflict, the presence of HIV/AIDS is rendering 
them increasingly irrational and counterproductive in the long term. (Elbe 
2002, 175) 
 
It becomes obvious that there is an indirect but very strong reciprocal relation 
between HIV/AIDS and poor economic, social and political conditions. Therefore, in 
order to effectively counteract such poor conditions and avoid state failure, it is 
absolutely essential to fight HIV/AIDS, and - of course - vice versa.  The former 
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American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was very much aware of the destructive 
effects of HIV/AIDS. In 2001 he expressed that  
 
No war on the face of the earth is more destructive than the AIDS 
pandemic. I was a soldier. But I know of no enemy in war more insidious 
or vicious than AIDS. An enemy that poses a clear and present danger to 
the world. […] We are all vulnerable -- big nations and small, the wealthy 
and the poor. (Colin Powell 2001) 
 
 He correctly emphasized that fighting AIDS must not only be in the interest of 
the affected African countries, but equally in the interest of Western countries. Reduced 
levels of state capacity create conditions in which terrorist and criminal networks can 
operate and train. In October 2001 Powell’s British counterpart, Foreign Minister Jack 
Straw, pointed out that in the twenty-first century the real threat is not from states with 
too much power, as is was in the twentieth century, but from states with too little, 
because “terrorists are strongest where states are weakest” (Straw 2001).  
These arguments assume that African governments are legitimate, fair, respect 
human rights and the rule of law, and act for the benefit of their population. This is 
certainly not always the case! Nonetheless, history has shown that countries where these 
conditions are fulfilled and the government acts as an effective service deliverer for the 
population are more prosperous and peaceful than countries with continuous unrest and 
low state capacity. Elbe argues convincingly that state collapse involves at least three 
interrelated processes. First, the economy is transformed or destroyed and violence 
increases. Second, political institutions dissolve. Third, social institutions like the family 
or the health and education sector are damaged. As outlined in this chapter, HIV/AIDS 
massively affects all three of them and therefore has to be regarded as an immense 
security concern with respect to state failure and political stability, especially in states 
that are already weak or face complex emergencies (Elbe 2003, 46).  
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 State Failure and Africa in a Civilianized International System  
 
When Washington made the global ‘war on terrorism’ its primary goal in 
international politics, almost from day one Africa became an important 
theatre in this new security framework. (Engel and Olson 2005b, 15) 
 
In Chapter I I pointed out that Germany’s prime interest in Africa is the 
establishment of civilianized structures in order to include African countries into a 
civilianized international system. In section 2.2 I argue that high levels of HIV/AIDS 
create conditions favorable to state failure. In this section I will show that state failure is 
in direct conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest. The problems that come 
along with state failure are fundamental problems for the creation of civilianized 
structures which Germany as a civilian power needs to operate effectively. Crocker 
defines state failure as a process where  
 
Corrupt elites might ally themselves with criminal networks. […] State 
authority might be undermined and replaced in particular regions, paving 
the way for illegal trading operations. […] state security services might 
lose their monopoly on the instruments of violence, leading to a 
downward spiral of lawlessness [and] the collapse of state power in large 
sections of the country. […] State failure, inextricably linked with 
internal strife and humanitarian crisis, can spread from localized unrest to 
national collapse and then regional destabilization. […] Invariably, state 
failure is accompanied by the victory of guns over normal politics, the 
rise of corrupt autocrats who thrive on conflict and deny freedom to their 
people. (Crocker 2003, 34-35) 
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Another definition, fairly similar to Crocker’s, is based on the CIA-sponsored 
State Failure Task Force, which was established in 1994 at the behest of Vice President 
Al Gore. King and Zeng define state failure as  
 
the complete or partial collapse of state authority, such as occurred in 
Somalia and Bosnia. Failed states have governments with little political 
authority or ability to impose the rule of law. They are usually associated 
with widespread crime, violent conflict, or severe humanitarian crises, 
and they may threaten the stability of neighboring countries. States that 
sponsor international terrorism or allow it to be organized from within 
their borders are all failed states. (King and Zeng 2001, 623) 
 
Taking into account both definitions of state failure, we can identify five major 
problems linked to state failure.  
 
1. Complete or partial collapse of state authority and state power in large 
parts of the country;  
2. Lawlessness and increasing anarchy;  
3. Corrupt elites as well as criminal or terrorist networks become 
influential in the state; 
4. Rising levels of crime and violence in the country; 
5. Humanitarian crisis.  
 
Germany wants none of the above in the international system it needs to prosper. 
This is the basis of the German interest in preventing state failure and has an enormous 
impact on German Africa policies.  
In Africa the problems commonly associated with state failure have been present 
almost immediately after independence. With the recent emergence of international 
terrorism it has also become a major problem for international security. Western 
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countries have realized that national security is a lot more than having secure borders. 
Neglecting weak states and excluding them from the international community of states 
can have severe consequences for international security, since those nations can become 
social and territorial breeding grounds for criminal networks and activity. The examples 
of Sudan and Afghanistan illustrate such a development. The danger that “Africa might 
become the global catalyst for failing states, crime and chaos or the centre for anti-
globalization activists” (translated from Öhm and Weiland 2002) cannot be denied. 
Failing states are more likely to be informally controlled by criminal organizations since 
they simply lack the power to exercise effective control over their full national territory 
or are more tempted to cooperate with criminals and terrorists if such groups support the 
official government financially and/or politically. Kühne points out that the weakness of 
national and regional structure is a reason for the fact that Africa is still a romping 
ground for global and regional players despite its relative economic and strategic 
irrelevance (Kühne 1999). Those global players are usually the ones that only go to 
places where leaders either do not know about them or can be persuaded not to care. 
The process of state failure is gradual and usually expresses itself in such a way 
that the central government increasingly loses the capability to act as effective service 
deliverer for the population. Rotberg argues that the primary function of any state is to 
provide the political good of security. This refers both to classical security issues, such 
as prevention of external invasion or internal attacks on the national order or the social 
structure, and also to human security issues, such as avoidance of diseases or epidemics. 
The state’s responsibility is to provide both such security and a framework in which 
various actors of the society and its economy have the chance to perform reasonably 
effectively. Differences amongst various actors within the state should be resolved 
without the use of violence. Only if such security is guaranteed can other political goods, 
such as infrastructure, education, health care be delivered. State failure counteracts the 
provision of such goods, especially security, by the state (Rotberg 2003, 5).  
In a case of state failure, non-state actors gain increasing influence. Such actors 
have little interest in the provision of political goods to the population, only in 
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maximizing their own benefits. Rotberg points out that they can take “opportunistic 
advantage of a deteriorating internal security situation to mobilize adherents, train 
insurgents, gain control of resources, launder funds, purchase arms, and ready 
themselves for assault on world order” (Rotberg 2003, 1). Rotberg’s argument targeted 
American policy makers in the framework of the Project 2020 of the National 
Intelligence Council, but it applies no less to Germany. With respect to the problems 
Rotberg outlines, there is no disagreement between American and German policy 
makers that it is essential to counteract such situations. There are substantial differences 
on how to do this, but the fact that those conditions are incompatible with the visions of 
most Western countries on how the world should operate, is not the point of discussion. 
Talking about the United States, Rotberg continues to argue that  
 
A global superpower cannot prosper at home if its attention and energies 
are endlessly distracted by threats from and instability abroad. From a 
cost-benefit analysis, too, it is much less expensive to prevent state failing 
and failure than it is to provide post-conflict humanitarian relief and/or 
funds for post-conflict reconstruction. Afghanistan and Iraq are only the 
latest examples of how costly intervention can be, followed by an even 
more expensive process of societal rebuilding. It is in the U. S. interest to 
recognize the obvious tocsins of deterioration in weak nation-states so 
that it can help avert the slide toward failure and the enormous costs and 
consequences of such a slide. (Rotberg 2003, 8) 
 
Certainly Germany is not a global superpower. Nonetheless state failure is in 
fundamental contrast to German foreign political interest, because it is in fundamental 
contrast to the role concept of a civilian power. Table 4 compares the key criteria of the 
civilian power concept and the key criteria for the classification of state failure.  
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Table 4: Comparison of the criteria for civilian powers and state failure
Civilian Power State Failure
multilateralism and supranational integration collapse of state authority and power
rule of law and institution-building lawlessness and increasing anarchy
free trade and social and economic balance rise of criminal and terrorist networks
rejection of the use of force crime and violence
human rights and binding norms humanitarian crisis and suppression
 
 
No civilian power can have an interest in state failure. In fact, no nation-state 
seeking to act as a global power has an interest in state failure, however, a civilian power 
has even less capabilities to deal with the problems associated with state failure than a 
great power. If a state fails and can not be included in a broader international system, the 
possibilities for a civilian power to interact with such a state become very limited. In 
general, states prefer to deal with states compared to non-state actors. States need other 
states which are representative for and in control of their population in order to interact 
in the international system. If various underground groups control a country and the 
government has no control of the population or the territory, there is no point for another 
country to interact with such a government. Thus as a general tendency in international 
relations, functioning states prefer to interact with other functioning states, either on a 
bilateral level or within an institutional framework, because it is easier to interact as such 
than it is to interact with various different interest groups or organizations.  
It is extremely difficult to interact with or exercise power over underground 
groups, simply because such groups have little to lose. By contrast a nation-state has a 
lot to lose: trade networks, bi- and multilateral relations, ODA, inclusion in the 
international system etc.. A strong, rich state can fairly easily put economic or political 
pressure on a small, weak state, but not on a terrorist group: there it must use military 
action. Civilian powers in particular are very reluctant to use military action, and 
terrorist groups know that. Civilian powers have hardly any ability to exercise pressure 
on underground or terrorist groups that are widely dispersed in many countries, and that 
are difficult to localize and deal with. They do not stick to rules or laws, and they come 
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to no negotiation table. They do not receive any ODA and cannot be excluded from any 
international framework. They are outlawed already and do not have to fear any 
consequences if they do not act as a civilian power wants them to. That is precisely what 
makes them so dangerous and such a serious international threat.  
Ever since the prime threat to the West has moved from the Soviet Union to 
international terrorism, the situation has changed significantly and elevated Africa’s role 
in international security affairs.  
 
After September 11th, it is possible to argue that sub-Saharan Africa is 
more important to global security than it was during the Cold War simply 
because the main threat to the US now comes from terrorists that hide in 
weak and failed states all over the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. 
During the Cold War, the main enemy to the ‘free world’ was clearly 
located geographically outside Africa. Compared with the 1990s, i.e. the 
post Cold War years when Africa was more or less insignificant in global 
security politics, today the region no doubt is much more important in 
security terms because it is important in the American strategy to fight 
terrorism globally. (Engel and Olsen 2005b, 8-9) 
 
Terrorist activity is certainly less a reason for concern in Kenya than it is in 
other, mainly Islamic countries, however, the bombings of the American embassy in 
Nairobi in 1998 and a hotel in Mombasa in 2002 alerted Western countries. After the 
9/11 terror attacks on the US, the German foreign ministry ordered a special investigator 
to its Nairobi embassy for several months to evaluate possible threats from terrorist 
activity in Kenya (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).  
In fragile regions it is important to have strong, legitimate governments, which 
are included into the international system and have the capabilities to exercise control 
over their territory to prevent it from being occupied by such networks. Governments 
need to be strong in order to effectively control their territory, subdue or destroy such 
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groups and to take away their territorial breeding ground. They need to be legitimate in 
order to reduce internal unrest, the likelihood of driving people in the arms of such 
networks and to take away their social breeding ground. In that context, the civilian 
power aspects of human rights and economic and social balance are highly relevant. 
They are part of the broader interest in having stable states with legitimate governments. 
Gray argues that governments derive their legitimacy from acting as service deliverers to 
their population.  
 
Governments are legitimate in so far as they meet the needs of their 
citizens. Those that fail will be judged by their citizens to be illegitimate 
whether or not they are democracies. People everywhere demand from 
their governments security against the worst evils: war and civil disorder, 
criminal violence, and lack of the mean of decent subsistence. How a 
state performs this protective role is the core test of its legitimacy. […] 
Thus it is not whether a state is a liberal democracy that most 
fundamentally determines its legitimacy; it is how well it secures its 
citizens against the worst evils. (Gray 1998, 149-150) 
 
Only if those conditions are fulfilled and governments have the capabilities to 
exercise effective control over all of their territory, can states be stable and focus on 
development and inclusion into an international system without continuously having to 
worry about the costs of staying in power due to internal unrest.  
Certainly, not all governments of fairly stable states act according to the Western 
countries’ vision of civilianized international system, but legitimate, stable governments 
are more likely to. In failing states, governments are hardly ever legitimate because they 
fail to deliver basic services, such as security, to the population, and they are certainly 
not stable, as levels of anarchy are increasing. As delivery of services largely fails, the 
chances for internal instability and state failure increase and the likelihood of peaceful 
and effective integration in a civilianized international system decreases.   
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The prime security concern of Western countries has thus moved from too strong 
states locked in a vicious rivalry to too weak states in the developing world excluded 
from a civilianized international system and posing incalculable risks (Straw 2001). Mair 
warns of the possibility of an ever widening gap between the developed and the 
developing world because it might replace the old East-West conflict with a North-South 
conflict, which “will certainly not be conducted in a similar all-embracing way but no 
less violently” (Mair 2002, 13-14). 
 
Summary 
 
The following three trends can be identified from looking at the AIDS-data 
presented in this chapter. First, sub-Saharan Africa is by far the most AIDS affected 
region of the world, the Southern part of the continent even more so than the Western 
and the Eastern. Second, Eastern Africa has shown hopeful signs of slowing the spread 
of the pandemic in recent years. Third, Kenya seems to follow Uganda as a successful 
example of a country which is effectively fighting the disease and seeing a sustained 
decline of prevalence rates across the country.   
High levels of HIV/AIDS hinder economic growth, disrupt the social structure 
and undermine political stability. Such levels drive young people into illegal activities, 
destabilize internal order and the rule of law, and reduce state capacity. AIDS 
contributes to violent conflicts, underdevelopment, political instability and state failure. 
Through increasing globalization and global interdependencies, Germany and other 
western countries have realized that state failure not only causes major problems in 
Africa but can also be a major problem for their own broader foreign political interests. 
As outlined in chapter I, Germany needs a civilianized international system in order to 
operate effectively. This requires the players in it to be “peaceful and civilian, developed 
and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding” (Mair 2002, 11). Failing states do not 
fulfill any of those criteria. Therefore, state failure is a major obstacle for Germany on 
the way to achieve its prime geopolitical interest in the promotion of such a system.  
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CHAPTER IV                                                                            
THE ‘CIVILIAN POWER’ GERMANY AND ITS 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES FOR A CIVILIANIZED 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN AFRICA 
 
Chapter II outlined how the problem of HIV/AIDS is conducive to state failure 
and how state failure is in fundamental contrast to the international system which 
Germany needs to act successfully as a civilian power. This chapter will explain how 
Germany as a civilian power acts internationally and how that differs from a classical 
great power. Placing development policies in the broader context of foreign policies, it 
will then discuss in more detail the conception of German development policies and the 
German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya. Finally, this chapter illustrates that 
development policies play only a minor role for German grand strategy, but that German 
grand strategy is the major influence on development policies. I argue that German 
development policies are used as tools to pursue the broader geopolitical interest of the 
promotion of a civilianized international system.   
 
The Foreign Political Behavior of Germany as a Civilian Power  
 
Between 1994 and 1997 the ‘Civilian Powers’ project of the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) examined the foreign political behavior of Germany, Japan and the 
United States in order to evaluate to what extent these countries fit the criteria of a 
civilian power. Kirste and Maull created six categories of analysis, which represent the 
ideal type of civilian power behavior. These ideal behavior patterns were then compared 
to the actual foreign political behavior of the three countries in order to determine the 
congruence between actual policy and the ideal type of the role concept. The six 
categories are:  
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- Influence in the international system: civilian powers are powers. They aim 
to participate in the shaping of the international system and take 
responsibility, not by way of exclusive leadership, but rather by seeking 
influence through collective action and by setting examples of how to act; 
- National goals: security, welfare, social balance, democratic stability. 
Foreign policy aims to transfer the interior level of civilianized structures to 
the international system; 
- International goals (organization): civilianizing international politics, partial 
transfer of sovereignty and acceptance of binding international norms, 
institutionalization of international relations and rule of law, also in the 
context of conflict settlement; 
- International goals (contents): human rights, good governance, participatory 
democracy, rule of law, pluralism, market economy, and sustainable 
development for social, ecological and economic balance. Inclusion of 
countries into the international system is also tied to conditions with the 
possibility of multilateral interference in the affairs of a sovereign state if it 
does not comply with the rules;  
- Foreign political practices: no do-it-alone practices, instead focus on 
multilateral action, international cooperation institutionalized through the 
transfer of sovereignty, especially in the security sector, problem solving 
through negotiation and compromises, rejection of the use of force except for 
cases of self-defense or collectively legitimized measures;  
- Foreign political instruments: political instruments, negotiations, sanctions, 
conditions, etc. Acceptance of the use of force in collectively legitimized 
cases, counteract aggressors through a system of collective security. (Kirste 
and Maull 1996, 301-303) 
 
The authors of the project came to the conclusion that in the late 20th century 
German foreign policy has been that of a civilian power. It does not exactly fit the ideal 
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typical role model developed by Maull and advanced in the DFG-project but it has high 
congruence. Indeed, of the three countries studied - Germany, Japan and the United 
States – Germany shows the highest congruence to the ideal role concept of a civilian 
power.  
For Germany and Japan 21 cases of foreign political behavior in significant 
international situations were examined, for the United States 24 cases. In 81 percent of 
the cases Germany’s foreign political behavior complied with the ideal typical behavior 
of the role concept civilian power; Japan followed with 66 percent. With only 46 percent 
the United States’ foreign political behavior differed quite significantly from the ideal 
type civilian power (Frenkler et al 1997, 102-106). To a large extent the United States 
thus, predictably, acts more as the classical great power it is than as a civilian power. 
The greatest differences between American foreign policy and the civilian power 
concept are in the categories of multilateralism, supranational integration and the 
restriction of the use of force as a means for international politics. The transfer of 
national sovereignty to a supranational institution is in fundamental contrast to current 
American foreign policy. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United 
States clearly states that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) “does 
not extend to Americans” and will not be accepted (White House 2002, 31).  
 Multilateralism is generally regarded as preferable; however, the United States 
shows a much higher willingness for unilateral action than a civilian power. O’Loughlin 
was right in foreseeing that “the US will continue to pursue its political interests 
unilaterally at the costs of international co-operation” (O’Loughlin 1993, 109). Nine 
years later the NSS stated that “In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, 
judgment, and interest of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart 
when our interests and unique responsibilities require” (White House 2002. 31).  
Similar differences to civilian power ideals become evident in the perception of 
the use of force. The United States strongly favors restricting the use of force by all other 
actors in international politics, but with respect to its own foreign political interests, it is 
generally willing to use its military might. The United States government believes that 
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“it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” (White House 
2002, 29). Even though an ideal typical civilian power does not completely reject the use 
of force, it would usually only employ military action multilaterally, as a result of a 
severe violation of one of its fundamental principals, as the last resort, and in the context 
of collective security (Maull 1993, 119-122). 
Kagan contrasts the differences in the European and American perceptions of 
power in the international system. Even though Kagan does not use the term civilian 
power, the political behavior he attributes to Europe is largely coherent with civilian 
power ideals. His distinction is helpful to illustrate Europe’s differences to the United 
States as a great power. Kagan argues that  
 
Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is 
moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and 
transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical 
paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s 
“Perpetual Peace”. The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in 
history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where 
international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the 
defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession 
and use of military might. (Kagan 2002, 3)  
 
However, the distinction between great power and civilian power is different 
than the distinction between hard power and soft power. When Nye discusses hard 
power and soft power, he outlines three ways of exercising power with respect to 
affecting the behavior of others. First, coercing with threats (sticks). Second, inducing 
with payments (carrots). Third, attracting or co-opting so that a power’s own goals are 
appealing to others and considered legitimate (Nye 1990). Soft power refers to the third 
option and tries to make others act in a certain way by convincing them of the attraction 
of one’s own goals.  
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Hard power and soft power are mechanisms and ways to exercise power in the 
international system. Even though the term ‘civilian power’ can also fall into that 
category and refer to a path to certain international goals, it describes more than that. It 
mainly refers to an actor or a specific role concept which encompasses the entire foreign 
political behavior of a nation state (Kirste and Maull 1996, 297). Great powers and 
civilian powers are either actors in the international system or concepts that describe 
their behavior. Hard power and soft power are the instruments of their behavior. 
Certainly, great powers and civilian powers employ different means to achieve their 
goals, but they need to be understood as actors, not just as ways of power projection. 
Usually, great powers have the tendency to employ more hard power than civilian 
powers and civilian powers tend to work more through soft power than great powers. 
Nonetheless, both great powers and civilian powers employ both hard power and soft 
power. Khanna expresses the tendencies by arguing that  
 
the United States conceives of power primarily in military terms […] By 
contrast, Europeans understand power as overall leverage. […] Through 
massive deployments of “soft power” (such as economic clout and 
cultural appeal) Europe has made hard power less necessary. (Khanna 
2004, 67) 
 
Classifying a great power as hard power and a civilian power as soft power is 
thus insufficient, because hard power and soft power are only techniques of power 
projection within the broader foreign political frameworks of either great powers or 
civilian powers.  
Acting as a civilian power proved so successful for Germany that as early as the 
late 1960s Germany had developed the world’s second largest economy (World Bank 
2006). Germany moved from being a civilian actor in the international system to 
becoming a civilian power in the later decades of the Cold War, developing considerable 
influence on the way the global economy operated. It developed into a classical trading 
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state, whose wealth was not rooted in resources but in trade. There are two ways for 
trading states to operate successfully. One way is for the trading state to ensure itself an 
international environment in which it can trade: similar to the British Imperial model of 
the late 19th century. Alternatively, the trading state relies on international institutions as 
the framework for trade: the modern American model (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 20). 
However, as the world’s most powerful nation the United States still needs to back up 
the international system based on institutions and the rule of law. The difference to the 
British model of the late 19th century is that the American model also allows other states 
to benefit from the system to the same extent, because it creates a framework generally 
open to any player acting according to rules of the system (Agnew 2005, 220).  
Germany has never been in a powerful enough position to enforce an 
international environment favorable to trade by itself. The second case is exactly what is 
essential to Germany’s role as a trading state. It has been a free rider in the global 
American system of liberal capitalism. As such Germany might have benefited from the 
system even more than the United States itself, because Germany was allowed to take 
full advantage of system, mainly with respect to free trade, without having to bear the 
costs to secure these functioning of the system. The stronger the system becomes in itself 
and the less the United States is needed to safeguard it, the better it is for Germany. This 
case is very much congruent with the role concept of a civilian power.  
This grand strategy has prevailed through German reunification and also through 
the change of the government in 1998, although it has been modified by German 
domestic politics. Germany’s foreign policy identity matured in the late 1990s. In the 
immediate aftermath of reunification, it was clear that Helmut Kohl would not radically 
alter German foreign policies. Kohl built his political career when German foreign 
policy was determined by the close alliance with the United States and inclusion in the 
American international system. Gerhard Schröder, on the other hand, was from a 
different generation of German politicians. When he came to power European 
integration was well underway and Europe had left the status of an American 
protectorate and was on its way to becoming the largest integrated economy in the world 
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and a counterweight to American dominance. Germany was the largest country in 
Europe and its political, and especially economic, weight was clearly a different one than 
when Kohl took power in 1982.  
Schröder and his foreign minister Joschka Fischer pushed for a more active role 
for Germany in global politics. However, just as Kohl, Schröder acted within the role 
concept of a civilian power. Kohl did because that was how Germany gained strength 
and influence during his political career. Schröder did because it was the only way 
reunified Germany could thrive internationally and be a politically important global 
actor. Having very limited military strength, Germany needed – and still needs - an 
international system in which it can operate effectively as a civilian power. Any other 
version of an international system would render Germany a minor player. Schröder 
realized that his goal of establishing Germany as a more influential player in global 
politics could only be achieved within the framework of its traditional foreign policy 
identity and grand strategy as a civilian power.   
In more recent work Maull has argued that despite the German military 
involvement in the Kosovo war and Operation Enduring Freedom, Germany still largely 
acts as a civilian power. German use of force in those conflicts did not mark a radical 
departure from German foreign policy identity: it was justified by humanitarian reasons 
and took place in the context of multilateral action within the institutional context of 
NATO. Especially in the case of the Kosovo war, non-participation of Germany would 
have severely undermined the credibility and acting power of the European Union as 
well as of NATO (Maull 2000, 2004). As such it would have been contradictory to the 
civilian power ideal of powerful institutions and effective rule of international law. For a 
civilian power to thrive, it can not accept such violations of its basic principles as were 
perpetrated by the Milosevic regime in its own backyard.  
Despite their generally pacifist character, civilian powers are powers that seek to 
influence the international system to conform to their interests. If those interests are 
seriously threatened it is within the ideal typical role concept of a civilian power to 
employ severe measures to safeguard its version of the international system. This way of 
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thinking has been deeply embedded in German politics ever since World War II ended. 
When the German Basic Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic was created in 
1948, it called the form of government a ‘defenseful democracy’. It purposely omitted 
any constitutional possibility to abolish democracy as the form of government as was the 
case when Hitler legally transformed the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich. The 
Weimar Republic was simply too democratic for a democratically inexperienced 
Germany and had left open the possibility of abolishing democracy based on a popular 
vote.  
After World War II, the makers of the Basic Constitutional Law, under intense 
supervision and pressure by the Allies, anchored certain principals in the German 
constitution which can not be changed. Any threat to those principles legitimizes the use 
of measures otherwise ousted in order to defend those principles (Rudzio 1999, 48-52). 
The notion that certain principles are central and need to be defended with all possible 
means, is also apparent in the role concept of civilian powers. Accordingly, to protect a 
civilianized international system, force can be legitimately used under certain conditions, 
such as a within strong multilateral coalition and for humanitarian reasons. 
Just as the use of force in the case of the Kosovo war in 1999 is within the 
civilian power framework, the rejection of the use of force in the case of the Iraq war in 
2003 is also within the framework. On the one hand Schröder’s behavior was clearly 
motivated by the upcoming elections. He fully exploited the strong popular opposition 
towards a possible military engagement in Iraq in his re-election campaign in 2002 to 
distract from his poor performance in domestic policies and present himself as the 
‘peace-chancellor.  
On the other hand Schröder’s behavior reflects civilian power behavior. Even 
though there were certainly humanitarian reasons to forcefully end Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorship and Iraq was not the ‘model’ state for a civilianized international system, the 
German government did not perceive it as an immediate threat to such a system. The 
more severe threat to the civilianized international system was the upcoming American 
invasion of Iraq, because it was not based on institutional legitimization, was not in a 
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strong multilateral context, and was not the last resort for counteracting a possible 
immediate threat to Germany’s national interests. The United States as the guarantor of 
international law has put itself above the law by illegitimately invading a sovereign 
country and has thus set a precedent for other countries to use military force regardless 
of international law and regulations. Such behavior of the world’s most powerful nation 
moved international politics clearly away from a civilianized international system, which 
is in contrast to Germany’s national interest because it elevates the importance of a 
powerful military, which Germany does not have.   
In fact, such a protection and promotion of a civilianized international system is 
at the heart of Germany’s grand strategy. The geopolitical changes of the 1990s and 
modern technology have transformed the world into a ‘global village’ where national 
boundaries are far less relevant. As a consequence, domestic and international policies 
can not be treated separately, but need to be integrated. Maull argues that 
 
We must either successfully export and extrapolate the mechanisms of 
taming social violence which we have developed at home, thus 
‘domesticating’ international relations, or suffer the intrusion of 
traditional patterns of international relations (anarchy, self-help and the 
resort to force) into our societies and polities. (Maull 1993, 118) 
 
 Maull sees the major problem of a return to an international system based on the 
balance of power and containment as its inability to address security threats intensified 
by an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world. The best example of such a 
security threat is the substantial intensification of international terrorism. During the 
Cold War, the West knew exactly who the enemy was, and where the enemy was, and 
could threaten it with severe consequences if it misbehaved (nuclear retaliation). This is 
not the case with terrorism which is why it is not only so difficult to fight for a civilian 
power, but also for a great power (Engel and Olsen 2005b, 15). Even though a great 
power has the capabilities and might have the political will for military action against the 
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enemy, it still would not know exactly who and where the enemy is. Terrorist enemies 
are so widely dispersed that even if one cell is taken out it does not mean total victory, 
because there are many more in many more different places who are able to operate 
independently.  
Gray argues that Al Qaeda is an “essentially modern organisation” and was the 
“the first practitioner of unconventional warfare to be truly worldwide in its operations” 
(Gray 2003, 76). This globalization of the main adversary in an increasingly interlinked 
world made a modification of the conventional security paradigm necessary. Agnew 
correctly points out that   
 
the United States is now more on the receiving rather than the delivering 
end of the forces liberated by globalization […] The United States today 
is undoubtedly the world’s most significant military power. But what this 
adds up to in a world of asymmetric warfare is unclear. (Agnew 2005, 
223) 
 
The global reach of terrorist and criminal networks has shown that military 
power alone is not enough to ensure national security or to act successfully on an 
international level. Flint emphasizes that  
 
Instead of a realist fixation upon military strength, the ability to exert 
power across the globe requires the political vision to construct a 
geopolitical project that will gain international support as well as the 
political will to carry it out. […] It will also require belief in the need and 
the value of a global civilizing mission. (Flint 2004, 366) 
 
According to Boulding such international support comes from integrative power, 
which he considers the most influential form of power. The concept is similar to Nye’s 
concept of soft power and refers to power deriving from legitimacy, respect and 
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consensual integration into a system portrayed as beneficial for all. Boulding argues that, 
without integrative power, the other two faces of power, coercive power and exchange 
power, will become ineffective, which causes a decline in overall power (Boulding 
1990). As a consequence, to be effective the foreign and security policy of a country has 
to focus increasingly on integrative power because 
 
Efforts to keep social violence and destruction at arms’ length, to create 
in effect a world divided along the lines between wealth and poverty 
through policies of containment, are also unlikely to work; in their 
frustration and desperation, the poor will find ways to cross our borders 
and tap our wealth, or – failing that – to destroy the foundations of our 
well-being. (Maull 1993, 118) 
 
Kupchan saw precisely this happening in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center because it was “made clear just how vengeful the backlash against globalization 
can be. […] Osama bin Laden was not just fighting against globalization, he was also 
exploiting it” (Kupchan 2003, 108). The point Gray, Maull and Kupchan are all making 
is that globalization is not exclusive to western societies and that they need a strategy to 
deal with its negative side effects.  
For a civilian power the strategy is to prevent such negative side effects by 
creating a civilianized international system which, ideally, would include all 
international players. Such a system is a lot more important for Germany as a civilian 
power than it is for the US as great power, because Germany is much more dependent on 
its structures in order to operate effectively. As mentioned above the United States acts 
both as a great power and a civilian power. If America can not achieve the international 
order it seeks by acting as a civilian power it can do so by acting as a great power, 
because it possesses the power projection tools of a great power. Those are unequally 
larger than the means of power projection of a civilian power, especially with respect to 
the effective deployment of military forces, or at least the threat to do so. Germany does 
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not have that option. It is not a great power and neither has effective means for the 
projection of military power nor the means to force through its interests beyond the 
limits of a civilianized international system. Therefore, for Germany the maintenance of 
such a world order is even more essential than for the United States, simply because it 
has no choice. Either the world order works, or Germany’s influence in it is very limited. 
For the United States it is favorable if the world order works, however, if it does not, 
America has the means to force the world order to work. Germany does not! That is why 
it is essential for Germany to conduct foreign policy towards the promotion of a 
civilianized international system.  
As part of such foreign politics, German development policies will be discussed 
in the following section 
 
Conception of German Development Policies 
 
Only in cooperation with others can we find solutions, open chances in 
future and promote peace, security and prosperity in our ‘One World’. 
Our understanding of development policies is based on the principles: 
fight against poverty, secure peace, shape globalization in a social and 
ecological way. (German Minister for Development Cooperation 
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, quoted in BMZ 2002, 4) 
 
As outlined in chapter I, German development policy after World War II was 
primarily intended to re-integrate Germany into the international community of states 
alongside the United States of America. It was a chance for the young Federal Republic 
to fulfil expectations of European and American partners for burden sharing in the Third 
World and to prove itself a reliable partner in international politics. From the very 
beginning German development policy had a strong multilateral character. When the 
first budget provisions for development assistance were made in the late 1950s, they 
were part of the European Development Funds (EDF). Adenauer wanted to act as an 
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equal partner in the newly established European Economic Community (EEC) and 
contributed increasingly to common actions such as the EDF. Development policies at 
that point were less a means to assist African development than a means to regain the 
trust of Western partners. Consequently, actions depended heavily on the interests of the 
partners. Germany would largely do what it was asked to do and not risk disagreements 
with its partners over such issues (Hofmeier 2002, 40-41).  
Especially in the early phase of German development policies during the late 
1950s and 1960s, even the design of bilateral programs reflected a political agenda 
shared by most Western countries on what ought to happen in Africa. Amongst 
European countries this agenda was expressed in the conventions of Lomé (1975-2000) 
and Cotonou (2000-2020), which regulate the funds of the EDF towards the ACP 
(Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries. Even though these conventions present a more or 
less common vision of European countries with respect to their relation with Africa, the 
financial scope has always been fairly limited in comparison with total ODA. The ninth 
round of EDF has a volume of $ 16.74 bn (€ 13.5 bn) for the years 2000 to 2007, 
whereas the combined total ODA of the three largest contributors, Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom, was valued at $ 23.82 bn (€ 19.20 bn) for 2004 alone (Schmidt 
2002; BMZ 2006a).   
As shown in figure 13, in the international comparison, Germany is the fifth 
largest donor worldwide behind the United States, Japan, France and the United 
Kingdom. At the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1970 donor countries 
agreed to spend at least 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA. In that 
respect, Germany’s limited commitment becomes even more obvious. Figure 14 
illustrates that of the 24 member countries of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) only 
five, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the Netherlands, fulfill the 
commitment to spend at least 0.7 percent of their GNI on ODA.  
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Figure 13: Net ODA of OECD countries in 2004. Source: OECD 2006a 
 
 
Figure 14: ODA as percentage share of GNI in 2004. Source: OECD 2006a 
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At 13th position the German ODA is, however, only slightly above the total ODA 
of 0.26 percent of GNI of DAC-countries. Figure 15 illustrates that as a share of GNI 
German ODA share has decreased steadily and dramatically since the peak of the early 
1980s, reaching its nadir in 1998. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union the interest in 
tying developing countries to the Western bloc was drastically reduced after 1990 and, in 
the case of Germany, funds were increasingly diverted to finance German reunification. 
As outlined in chapter I, Africa and the rest of the developing world simply moved lower 
and lower on the political agenda. This trend was somewhat reversed after the election of 
Schröder’s Red-Green government in 1998. However, even then the increase was 
marginal, from 0.26 percent in 1998 to 0.28 percent in 2004. Germany thus clearly lags 
seriously behind the 0.7 % commitment made in 1970.  
 
 
Figure 15: German ODA as percentage share of GNI 1964-2004. Source: BMZ 2006b 
 
Schröder’s government made a first step by aiming at 0.33 percent of the GNI for 
ODA for the year 2006 (BMZ 2006c). In November 2005, Angela Merkel, the leader of 
the conservative Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), became chancellor heading a 
so called Grand Coalition of her CDU and Schröder’s Socialdemocrats (SPD). Even 
though it marked the end of Schröder’s chancellorship, his party stayed in the ruling 
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coalition as junior partner. Considering that Federal Minister for Economic Co-operation 
and Development under Schröder, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, remained in office, a 
radical change in German development policy is unlikely. In fact Merkel’s rhetoric with 
respect to development policies is remarkably similar to Schröder’s. Not too different 
from Schröder’s 1998 redefinition of development policies as ‘global structural policies’, 
Merkel stated in her inaugural government declaration that “Global problems will reach 
us at home if we do not manage to solve them abroad” (Merkel 2005).  
Her grand coalition government seems to be continuing to increase ODA and has 
committed to reach 0.51% of GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015 (OECD 2006b). However, 
similar commitments have been made before and not fulfilled. Following an old English 
proverb, the late Sudanese Vice President, John Garang, stated: “The proof of the 
pudding is in the eating -- the proof of the pledge is in the cash” (quoted in Swissinfo 
2005). It remains to be seen whether Merkel’s government will live up to its promises.  
In Germany, the central agency to coordinate development cooperation is the 
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) – the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Roughly half of total 
German ODA is multilateral. In 2004, German multilateral ODA had a volume of $ 3.71 
bn (€ 2.99 bn), 49 percent of the total of $ 7.53 bn (€ 6.08 bn).  
 
EU
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Figure 16: Destination of German multilateral ODA. Source: OECD 2006c 
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Figure 16 shows that the largest part of German multilateral development 
cooperation is channeled through the European Union and the World Bank’s 
International Development Association (IDA); various UN agencies and regional banks 
receive those funds to a lesser extent. 
On the bilateral level, German ODA was € 3.08 bn ($ 3.82 bn) in 2004. The 
single largest share, roughly one third, goes to sub-Saharan Africa. Bilateral Cooperation 
is split into hardware and software components. Hugill argues that hardware refers to the 
provision of necessary tools, whereas software describes the knowledge and expertise to 
apply those tools (Hugill 1993, 11). With respect to development cooperation, hardware 
can be understood as Financial Cooperation (FC), which provides the funds for 
development cooperation as directly channeled through the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW). By volume, FC marks the most significant part of German 
development cooperation. FC is strongly tied to the general conditions for German 
development cooperation. It seeks to support the partner countries in reform processes 
aiming at more sustainable development and investments in economic and social 
infrastructure. Based on a constant review process with respect to the conformity with 
the general conditions for German development cooperation, FC also provides funds 
directly to partner countries. However, it is always conducted in close coordination with 
other German or international development measures (EFRG 2005, 4 and BMZ 2006f).  
The software component is Technical Cooperation (TC). It refers to the 
organization and actual carrying out of projects and programs in close collaboration with 
the partner governments, NGOs or the private sector (EFRG 2005, 4). The main German 
agency for TC is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) – the 
German Organisation for Technical Cooperation, it provides the four main services of 
TC 
1. The seconding of consultants, trainers and instructors, experts, appraisers 
and other specialists; 
2. The establishment of, and capacity building for, project executing 
organizations; 
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3. The provision of materials and equipment to fit out the facilities receiving 
assistance; 
4. Training and upgrading for local specialists and executives. 
 
These services are provided as grants and aim at transferring technical, 
economic, and organizational knowledge and skills as support for projects and programs 
of the partner countries (BMZ 2006e). The GTZ tries to diversify its engagement and 
cooperate with actors on three different levels: macro (national government), meso 
(provincial governments, civic society organizations) and micro (grassroots) (Author 
interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).  
As outlined above, the BMZ is the central German institution responsible for 
development policies. However, they are part of broader foreign policy set in the 
Chancellor’s Office and the Auswärtige Amt (AA) – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Nonetheless, within this broader foreign political framework, the BMZ and its on-the-
ground organizations, mainly the GTZ and KfW, are able to develop policies fairly 
independently. Since the end of the Cold War, German development policies have 
experienced two significant changes. First, when it became obvious that the Soviet 
Union was collapsing, tying African nations to the American led world economy became 
irrelevant. The criteria for providing German aid assistance required modification. In the 
fall of 1991, BMZ Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger tied German development cooperation 
to five conditions:  
 
1. Compliance with human rights; 
2. Participation of the population in the political process; 
3. Validity of the rule of law; 
4. Creation of a market-friendly system;  
5. Development-orientation of state organs. 
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This conditionalization of development policies clearly revealed the intention of 
the German government to be much more selective about recipient countries and to 
critically assess their political and socio-economic performance and conditions 
(Hofmeier 2002, 54).  
The second major change in German post Cold War development policy 
occurred after the change from Kohl’s conservative to Schröder’s Red-Green 
government in 1998. The role of the BMZ, with respect to its budget and position within 
the cabinet, was upgraded and an increased focus was put on  
 
- Human rights; 
- Crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution; 
- Civilianization and the rule of law in international relations. (Engel 2000, 
113-114) 
 
Shortly after Schröder took power, the responsibility for the development 
policies of the European Union was transferred from the Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft (BMWi) – the Federal Ministry of Economics - to the BMZ. It was the last 
branch of German development politics administered outside the BMZ at that point. 
Furthermore, the competences for consulting and technical assistance to Eastern Europe 
and newly independent countries were also transferred from the BMWi to the BMZ 
(BMZ 2004b, 32-33). Development policies moved from development ‘aid’ to ‘global 
structural policies’. The practical effects of these changes were the Schwerpunktbildung 
– priority setting - in German development politics and the focus on 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss – seamless development cooperation. 
Both aimed to make development cooperation more effective and to counteract problems 
such as inefficient projects, bureaucratic red-tape and overlaps of donor practices.  
Schwerpunktbildung made German development cooperation more focused on 
fewer countries and fewer sectors. The Red-Green government changed the policy from 
running a lot of small projects in many countries to engaging in a few specific sectors in 
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fewer countries. For Africa this meant that 16 countries were classified as priority 
partner countries, 10 as partner countries, 6 as potential cooperation countries and 17 
were not listed anymore (BMZ 2006d). On the one hand, in the 23 countries classified as 
potential partner countries or not listed anymore, development cooperation was radically 
cut or completely shut down. On the other hand, in priority partner countries 
development cooperation was extended and Germany would employ all its official 
development cooperation agencies2 to intensify development cooperation in three 
sectors. Those sectors were, officially, identified in bilateral negotiations between the 
governments. However, to a large extent the feedback of GTZ and KfW as well as the 
coordination with other donors determined development priorities for each country.  
For the practical level of development cooperation, Schwerpunktbildung marked 
an immense change. The decisions about which countries would be upgraded to priority 
partner countries or downgraded to anything less, was largely beyond the influence of 
GTZ and KfW. They were political decisions made in the Chancellor’s Office, the AA, 
or the BMZ and within the framework of Germany’s broader foreign political directives. 
Certainly, the criteria mentioned above, success of previous programs and the 
coordination with other donors were important factors which influenced decisions. The 
role of GTZ and KfW was thus restricted to presenting and evaluating past engagement 
in cooperation with the embassies of the referring countries to the decision makers 
(Author interview with Interviewee C, German diplomat).  
Once the countries to intensify cooperation with were identified, each individual 
sector had to prove that it would be worth continuing. Individual sector coordinators had 
to demonstrate that their programs were more efficient and show better results than the 
programs of other sectors and other countries and would therefore be continued. In this 
process the influence of the on-the-ground agencies was more significant. As stated 
                                                 
2
 Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) – German Technical Cooperation 
   Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) – Development Bank 
   Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) – German Development Service 
   Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM) – Centre for International Migration and                                 
   Development 
   Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (InWent) – Capacity Building International, Germany 
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above, within the broader foreign policy directives, the BMZ is largely free with regard 
to which sectors it engages in and what programs it runs. According to most 
interviewees the cooperation of the ministry with the embassies and the on-the-ground 
agencies is both productive and good. GTZ and KfW had a significant say in 
determining development priorities. Various sector coordinators were invited to the 
BMZ in Bonn to present their projects and contribute to the decision making process 
(Author interviews with Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee D, KfW).  
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss mainly aims at avoiding overlaps 
with projects of other donors through a more inclusive and comprehensive engagement 
approach. It is characterized not only by frequent consultation and cooperation between 
the various German agencies but also with other donors and their host countries. 
Assistance should be provided as a whole from the donor community, and not as 
individual and independent programs of various institutions. Especially amongst 
member countries of the European Union, this coordination and cooperation has made 
impressive progress in the last years, however, it has improved also with other donors 
(Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).  
In order to determine which sectors Germany would engage in, the relative 
success of the German projects in one sector to the success of projects of other donors 
was an important criterion. For example, even if there were good German efforts to 
improve access to fresh water in one specific country, they were unlikely to continue if 
another donor could work more efficiently and successfully in the same sector. The 
feedback of embassies and German agencies in the countries was a major part of the 
decision making process, however, the final say was with the BMZ. The on-the-ground 
organizations were certainly not in the political position to start an entirely new sector of 
cooperation without the BMZ’s approval. However, the BMZ would also not offer 
engagement to the host country or other donors in a sector where there would be no 
capabilities to conduct it successfully through its on-the-ground organizations (Author 
interview with Interviewee B, GTZ).  
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Considering that the countries for cooperation are chosen within the broader 
foreign political framework, it is unlikely that sectors or programs approved by the BMZ 
would be opposed by the AA. However, if it does happen, differences are first to be 
sorted out between the respective departments of the AA and the BMZ, then on the level 
of senior officials such as state secretaries, then on cabinet level between the ministers. 
If all of the above fail to reach an agreement, the final say is with the chancellor, who 
sets the overall political directives (Author interview with Interviewee C, German 
diplomat).   
As a more specific example of how German development policies work the next 
section illustrates German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya. 
 
German Programs on Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS in Kenya 
 
Germany was the first state to recognize Kenya after independence in 1963 and 
the two countries have traditionally had good diplomatic relations. Because of its 
important status in Eastern Africa, Kenya is a priority partner country for German 
development cooperation. However, in comparison with other countries receiving 
German ODA, the bilateral cooperation with Kenya is rather limited. It ranks 9th in sub-
Saharan Africa and only 24th globally with respect to the volume of the German 
assistance (OECD 2006c).  Currently, Germany is the fourth largest bilateral donor to 
Kenya after the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. Throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s, Germany was the second largest donor, but after German development 
cooperation was increasingly conditionalized in the early 1990s, bilateral commitments 
to Kenya were radically cut because of extensive corruption and bad governance (AA 
2006).  
Not only did Germany cut commitments to Kenya in the 1990s, but so did other 
bilateral donors as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
After severe pressure by the international community to fight corruption and commit to 
better and more transparent governance, the Kenyan government rather reluctantly 
implemented some of the changes asked for as a condition of donor assistance. As 
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Figure 17 shows, after severe cuts in the middle of the 1990s German bilateral ODA to 
Kenya slowly picked up again from 1997 onwards. When Kenya’s government changed 
in 2002, the international expectations for further progress in good governance and the 
fight against corruption in Kenya increased. The German government provided € 14.3 m 
($ 17.7 m) of immediate additional assistance to support the democratic shift. When 
Chancellor Schröder visited Kenya in 2004 he doubled bilateral ODA to a combined 
commitment of € 55 m ($ 68.2 m) for FC and TC in 2004/2005. 
 
 
Figure 17: German development cooperation with Kenya since 1992. Source: EFRG 
2005, 5 
 
These € 27.5 m are annual bilateral commitments of ODA, however, in 2004 the 
approved funding for all official German development efforts in Kenya valued a total of 
€ 293.6 m ($ 364.1 m) in 2004. This refers to all currently ongoing projects over a time-
span of several years and includes technical and financial cooperation of foundations, 
ecclesiastic organizations, semi-governmental and full governmental agencies (BMZ 
2004a). In Kenya, the three development priorities are private sector development in 
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agriculture, water sector development, and reproductive health. Approved funding of 
reproductive health projects in 2004 was € 42.05 m, 14% of the total of € 293.6 m. 
Those projects, which mainly deal with HIV/AIDS, account for the second largest single 
share of German development efforts in Kenya (BMZ 2004a). 
The overall German strategy of “seamless development cooperation” is of course 
also applied to German engagement in Kenya. As mentioned above, as priority partner 
country, all German state-run development agencies work in Kenya, and in addition also 
almost all German political foundations, ecclesiastical organizations, and NGOs. In 
order to avoid overlaps of the programs, all of the German institutions meet regularly in 
Nairobi and in Bonn. The state-run organizations active in Kenya have a compulsory 
meeting every other week in Nairobi. The non-state actors are not bound to coordination, 
however, it is in their own interest to work efficiently, so they also meet on a regular 
basis every 6 to 8 weeks. In addition to the meetings in Kenya, representatives of the 
head offices in Germany also meet twice a year in the BMZ in Bonn to coordinate their 
programs on the upper level (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).  
According to various German officials the exchange between the institutions in 
Kenya, and their head offices in Germany as well as with other state-run institutions is 
frequent and good (Author interviews with Interviewee A, German diplomat; 
Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee D, KfW). There are two means of communication, 
usually employed at the same time. The central agency responsible for all development 
cooperation is the BMZ in Bonn, which often interacts directly with its on-the-ground 
agencies in Kenya. Nonetheless, for routine exchange or special requests, 
communication would occur either through the head office of the on-the-ground agency 
in Germany, or the German embassy in Nairobi.  
It was no surprise that reproductive health was chosen as one of the German 
development priorities for Kenya. Germany has been active in the health sector in Kenya 
for about 30 years. In the past 15 years it has focused on the sub-sectors reproductive 
and sexual health and hence contributed significantly to national policies and strategies 
(BMZ 2003). The major cooperation partner has always been the Kenyan Ministry of 
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Health (MoH) and since its creation in 1999 also the National AIDS Control Council 
(NACC). It was not until 1999 that President Daniel arap Moi officially declared 
HIV/AIDS a national disaster and began actively to fight against the pandemic. The 
NACC was established to coordinate the efforts of all institutions, international and 
domestic, in a multisectoral approach. However, the real breakthrough in government 
efforts came in 2002 with Kibaki’s election.  
German activities have usually been developed through the joint efforts of the 
German organizations GTZ, KfW, DED, InWEnt and Malteser Germany as well as with 
representatives of various official Kenyan institutions and local NGOs. For the most part 
they have focused on ‘high potential areas’, the most densely populated regions of 
Western, Eastern and Nyanza Provinces (EFRG 2005, 11). German engagement operates 
on three levels. First, on the macro level cooperation provides mainly policy advising 
and concept development through ministries, national associations, and civil society 
organizations. For example, the GTZ provided a permanent technical assistant for 
advising and coordination to the Kenyan Ministry of Health. Second, the meso level 
focuses on institutional capacity building as well as on supervision and coordination of 
various programs of provincial administrations, civil society organizations and 
associations in the provinces. Third, cooperation on the micro level is strongly directed 
at community based approaches, education counseling and the promotion of self-help 
groups in districts, communities, as well as public and private service providers (BMZ 
2003, 7-8). 
To a very large extent, the German efforts are coherent with the Kenyan strategy 
to fight AIDS. The Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategy Plan 2005/6 – 2009/10 outlines 
three priority areas in the fight against HIV/AIDS: Prevention of new infections; 
Improvement of the quality of life of people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS; and 
Mitigation of the socio-economic impacts of HIV/AIDS (NACC 2005). The three 
priorities of German AIDS policies in Africa are: Prevention; Treatment; and Care and 
Support of HIV-positive people and their social environment (BMZ 2004c, 11-13). It 
becomes obvious that both governments pursue very similar strategies in the fight 
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against HIV/AIDS, which is not surprising since the long German engagement in this 
sector has had significant influence on Kenyan policies. 
Almost all interviewees describe the cooperation of German organizations with 
Kenyan institutions and local agencies as good and open. The claim of German officials 
that German development cooperation seeks to understand a problem as a whole by 
including and consulting locals as wells as NGOs and other organizations was confirmed 
by the interviewees from NGOs and official Kenyan institutions (Author interviews with 
Cheluget; Kalweo; Kiarie; Odhiambo). This consulting process takes place mainly on 
the micro and meso levels of cooperation, but is channeled via the embassy, the GTZ 
and the KfW to the BMZ in Bonn and contributes to the decision making process in the 
ministry (Author interviews with Interviewee A, German diplomat; Interviewee B, GTZ; 
and Interviewee C, German diplomat). As a result of these processes, German projects 
over the past years have largely focused on:  
 
- community-based distribution of condoms and oral contraceptives as well as 
social marketing of condoms; 
- supply of contraceptives, drugs and medical equipment to reduce the birth rate, 
maternal mortality and the incidence of HIV;  
- prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT); 
- development of concepts to combat female genital mutilation and on youth 
sexuality (peer counseling); 
- development and implementation of a multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS control strategy; 
- concept development and capacity building for quality management in the 
Ministry of Health;  
- advisory assistance (with WHO) in developing and introducing a socially  
equitable health insurance scheme and a National Social Health Insurance Fund. 
(BMZ 2003, 4-5) 
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The main target groups to be reached with immediate on-the-ground programs 
are those Kenyans who have no access to adequate services for reproductive and sexual 
health. Furthermore, people who face increased poverty due to high payment for health 
services or those who are unable to afford health services are intended to benefit most 
from the German programs. Those happen to be mostly adolescents, women and girls, as 
well as commercial sex workers (CSW) (BMZ 2003, 9). There has been a heavy focus 
on mainstreaming HIV/AIDS by creating awareness that it is not merely a health issue, 
but needs to be treated at all sectors of the society and the state. There are AIDS 
programs in all efforts of German development cooperation, not only in the development 
priority of Reproductive Health. Funds for fighting HIV/AIDS are not only channeled 
into the framework of health cooperation, but also into other projects, seemingly 
unrelated to health issues (BMZ 2003, 7 and DED 2004, 10).  
Considering the massive implications of the pandemic for the entire society and 
the state, it has become obvious that the only effective way to fight it is an approach 
which is also present in the entire society and the state. This multi-sectoral approach of 
mainstreaming HIV/AIDS has proved to be a very successful strategy in the past for 
linking all the efforts in the fight against HIV/AIDS from one particular donor. Germany 
is not the only actor who has realized this. All Kenyan ministries and governmental 
institutions are required to deal with AIDS. By 2007 all selected districts are required to 
integrate HIV/AIDS control activities in their annual work plans (BMZ 2003, 9). Even 
on the level of rural primary schools, education on AIDS is a top priority. It is included 
in all subjects from grade 1 (Author interview with Ndungu).  
At the international level the donor community has also increasingly 
mainstreamed the problem of HIV/AIDS. Cooperation and coordination has improved 
considerably in recent years. Major donors, bilateral and multilateral, meet monthly in 
the Health Donor Working Group and the Inter Agency Coordination Committee to 
improve networking, coordination and strategic orientation amongst each other (Author 
interview with Interviewee B, GTZ). With respect to HIV/AIDS the different donors 
seems to have a strong common interest in coordinating their efforts in an efficient way 
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to avoid overlaps. Most participating donors are quite flexible within the broader 
political directives of the governments.  
The comparison of American and German programs to fight AIDS in Kenya is a 
very good example of how a great power and a civilian power differ in their 
development policies. According to several interviewees, German efforts to fight 
HIV/AIDS are based on high levels of consultation and cooperation with local agencies 
and other donors. The experiences of past programs and other institutions are taken into 
account and have an effect on the design of future projects. Such consultations occur on 
the local level, as the GTZ cooperates with other donors, NGOs or local organization to 
get a broader understanding of the problem (Author interview with Cheluget; Kalweo; 
and Kiarie). Furthermore, they also occur within the structure of German development 
bureaucracy as the BMZ is regularly consulting the GTZ on the programs. Thus, the 
feedback which is locally obtained by the GTZ is taken seriously in both the agency and 
the BMZ. However, I do not intent to overestimate the actual influence such feedback 
has on decisions made at the ministerial level in the BMZ. But, according to the 
interviewees the GTZ stresses the importance of consultation and cooperation, and the 
feed back from other actors in the field is reflected in German programs (Author 
interviews with Ferguson; and Interviewee B, GTZ). 
Jane Kalweo from UNAIDS points out that the coordination of donors in the 
health sector has improved in recent years. Especially, the countries of the European 
Union are focusing increasingly on a better coordination of their AIDS programs in 
Kenya (Author interview with Kalweo). Germany pushed strongly towards more 
collective efforts to fight AIDS in Kenya and its role in the creation and establishment of 
coordinating institutions such the Health Donors Working Group and the Interagency 
Coordination Committee was central. The monthly meetings of these donor groups 
underline the ambition of donors to coordinate their efforts in order to provide more 
efficient assistance.  
These aspects of German AIDS programs in Kenya clearly reflect the foreign 
policy behavior of a civilian power. Even though what is described above is bilateral 
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development cooperation, it clearly reveals the civilian power characteristics of 
multilateral action, institution building and participatory decision making. It is a strong 
example of basing development policies on the commitment to cooperation and 
collective action in order to maximize the impact of the efforts and reach the intended 
outcome.  
 American programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya, on the other hand, clearly 
reflect the foreign political behavior of a great power. Since George W. Bush launched 
the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, American funds 
for the fight against HIV/AIDS have increased tremendously, but their usage is bound by 
the ideological and religious directives of the socially conservative Bush administration. 
Most of the money is used for the distribution of Anti Retroviral Drugs (ARVs), which 
significantly improve the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR is, however, 
very restrictive with respect to promoting condom use and the inclusion of commercial 
sex workers (CSW) and drug users, which represent to most affected groups.  
American AIDS-programs were described by most interviewees as fairly 
inflexible and rigid in the use of the funds. Even though cooperation with other donors 
has improved in more recent years, there is little consultation with locals or other 
organizations. Where interaction with other donors or local agencies does occur it seems 
to have little impact on the American strategy to fight the disease (Author interviews 
with Ferguson; Kalweo; and Kiarie).  
 Overall, American efforts to fight HIV/AIDS are less flexible and more 
unilateral than the ones of other donors. American aid workers in Kenya have very clear 
instructions on what the funds are to be used for and what needs to be done. They are 
well aware of the difficulties this causes and try to work closely with other donors in 
Kenya, so that areas where they are restricted are covered by others. The monthly 
meetings of the donor groups have proved effective in coordinating such efforts in the 
sense that the various donors complement each other geographically and in terms of 
contents (Author interview with Interviewee B, GTZ).  
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The previous sections have shown why Germany uses its foreign policies to 
promote an international system and how German development policies work. The next 
section examines how German development policies are influenced by its grand strategy 
as a civilian power. 
 
Influence of the Grand Strategy on Development Policies in Africa 
 
Preventive security politics means to conduct development policies which 
prevent conflicts by counteracting the problems where they are created. 
Hence, development policies are always security policies. (Richard von 
Weizsäcker 2000) 
 
As a civilian power, Germany sees its part in the promotion of a civilianized 
international system not in military terms, but in specific foreign policies that aim to 
prevent certain situations from reaching a level where the use of force in inevitable. 
Having a very weak military, but being the world’s leading exporter, Germany needs an 
international system where military power clearly comes well after the rule of 
international law and institutions, as well as interdependencies and free trade. German 
power is economic, not military. International economic interactions work better in a 
secure, stable, law-abiding and organized environment. Germany needs an international 
system where economic power translates into political power and where military power 
is not needed to force through a country’s own national interest.  
Because Germany cannot use military power as a means to pursue its global 
interests, it needs to use its economic strength, such as sanctions or exclusion of markets, 
or laws of international agreements and institutions. The emphasis on using development 
policies for the pursuit of broader geopolitical interests became more relevant after 
Schröder took office in 1998. The BMZ received a permanent seat in the 
Bundessicherheitsrat (BSR) – the Federal Security Council, which consists of the 
Chancellor and the Ministers for the Office of the Chancellor, Foreign Affairs, Defense, 
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Finance, Interior Affairs, Justice, Economy, and, since 1998, the Minister for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. The BSR meets in closed sessions on the cabinet 
minister level and is the highest and most important organ for the setting of German 
foreign and security policies. Granting the BMZ a permanent seat is a clear sign of 
Germany’s realization that developing countries and the policies towards them became 
increasingly important with respect to broader international politics (Engel 2000, 112-
123).  
Germany has realized that it can no longer be a free rider in the American world-
economic system, but that it actively needs to promote a civilianized international 
system itself. Military engagement is not an option. Germany does not have the 
necessary capabilities, the political will, or the popular support at home. In fact, the 
strong opposition towards military engagement among the German population favors 
pre-emptive measures, as long as they are civilian. Schröder took a firmer and more 
independent approach to position “Germany abroad as a middle-sized power for peace”  
(Schröder 2005). The rhetoric has changed. Whereas Kohl previously offered an 
American president German capabilities and willingness to take international 
responsibility, Schröder tells Bush about Germany’s right to a more important voice 
(Author interview with Interviewee C, German diplomat).  
It was the coalition agreement of Schröder’s first government in 1998 that 
abandoned development policies as development aid and started to consider them as 
global structural politics (SPD/Grüne 1998). As a result, development policies became 
far more politicized and integrated into the broader foreign policy context of the federal 
government (Author interview with Interviewee D, KfW). 
For example, after the beginning of operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, 
some € 80 m ($ 99.2 m) were cut out of the budget of the BMZ and transferred to the 
AA to be channeled to Afghanistan as ODA (Author interview with Interviewee E, 
GTZ). As the BMZ was required to act more forcefully according to the foreign political 
directives set in the AA and the chancellor’s office, it also in turn took firmer control 
over its on-the-ground agencies. The work of GTZ and KfW has become increasingly 
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politically controlled either through the BMZ or the German embassies in the partner 
countries. There is still a good amount of flexibility for the agencies, but the programs 
are now more tightly integrated into the political directives between Germany and the 
partner countries, which are set at senior diplomatic levels (Author interview with 
Interviewee E, GTZ).  
In 1998 development policies started to be regarded as “policies for a secure 
future” and the “development cooperation with Africa as an expression of responsibility 
to reduce global risks in future and to increase security” (translated from BMZ 2001, 8). 
As a result of the changing geopolitical conditions and the realization of how much the 
situation in the developing world can affect Western countries, the provision of ODA 
significantly increased in most recent years. Figure 18 shows that the total ODA of all 
OECD countries went up from $ 53.8 bn (€ 43.4 bn) to $ 79.5 bn (€ 64.1 bn) between 
2000 and 2004, its share to Africa also increased from $ 10.4 bn (€ 8.4 bn) to $ 19.3 bn 
(€ 15.6 bn) during the same period.  
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Figure 18: ODA of all OECD countries (total and to Africa) 2000-2004. Source: 
OECD 2006c 
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Figure 19: German ODA (total and to Africa) 2000-2004. Source: OECD 2006c 
 
Figure 19 shows very similar trends for Germany. Its total ODA increased from $ 
5.03 bn (€ 4.06 bn) in 2000 to $ 7.53 bn (€ 6.06 bn) in 2004, the share of ODA to Africa 
from $ 0.87 bn (€ 0.7 bn) to $ 1.4 bn (€ 1.13 bn). The peak in 2003 is a result of special 
commitments which where made as a reaction to the crisis and the formation of a 
transitional government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003. With 
the increased spending, development policies were supposed to become more efficient as 
a tool for the promotion of a civilianized international system.  
The terror attacks of September 11th 2001 painfully revealed the negative side 
effects of globalization. Not only the economies of G8-countries enjoy the benefits of 
the ‘global village’, of interdependencies, of the relatively free movements of goods and 
services: international terrorism also takes advantage of such freedom. Furthermore, the 
increased transcontinental spread of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS or the avian flu, global 
environmental degradation, and millions of refugees moving from war-torn regions into 
Western countries have shown that it is essential for the West to assist the developing 
world in preventing such problems. In 1993 John O’Loughlin emphasized that “the 
levels of suffering in many parts of the world demand our constant concern, and not just 
when the television pictures of some atrociously violent act or devastating famine 
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command our brief attention” (O’Loughlin 1993, 109). Africa takes a central position in 
these concerns. It is the epicenter of global underdevelopment.  
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), half of the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa lives on less than one US-dollar per day and about one 
third suffers from malnutrition (UNDP 2006). It is also the continent with the most 
warfare and the highest risks for state failure. The Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research identified 54 violent conflicts in Africa in 2004, 13 of which were 
classified as ‘highly intensive violent conflicts’ (HIIK 2005, 15). Such severe 
underdevelopment and high conflict intensity make it impossible or extremely difficult 
to create civilianized structures in Africa. As a consequence, Germany seeks to 
counteract underdevelopment and forces of state failure in order to create the conditions 
favorable to the inclusion of African countries into a civilianized international system. 
Its goal is to “transfer the interior level of civilianized structures to the international 
system” (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301) and to African countries.  
Germany seeks to avoid situations where a country can not be included into the 
international system or at least in bilateral diplomatic conduct. Such a situation can be 
caused by two scenarios. In the first scenario, a specific state is domestically fairly stable 
and delivers services to the population, but does not want to act according to the rules of 
a civilianized international system or does not want to be included in such a system. 
Those are usually rather powerful developing or transitional states, such as China, 
Indonesia or various Middle Eastern states. The main issues of concern with respect to 
civilian power ideas are its insistence on human rights, good governance, or social and 
economic balance. In this case, it is difficult for Germany to act because the key actors, 
the German government and the government of the other country, pursue different goals. 
Germany as a civilian power can only exercise political and economic pressure or create 
incentives for the other government to change its policies.  
The second scenario refers to countries where the government is simply too weak 
to act as effective service deliverer. This usually applies to German engagement in 
Africa. If internal unrest and the forces of state failure are rising, the capabilities of the 
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government to become more civilianized and work towards an inclusion into a 
civilianized international system drops. In this case, the goals of Germany and the 
recipient state are more similar than in the first case. There is a certain coherence of 
interest with respect to creating stable economic, social and political conditions. It is in 
Germany’s interest to provide assistance to increase the capabilities of the partner 
government to deliver essential services, create more stability, avoid state failure and 
shape their country in a way more favorable to inclusion in a civilianized international 
system.  
In the first scenario development policies play a very minor role in the interaction 
between the governments. Development policies are clearly overshadowed by broader 
foreign policies and economic policies when it comes to relations with powerful 
developing or transitional countries, such as China, Brazil, India, etc. Violations against 
the conditions for German development cooperation do not necessarily cause severe 
consequences regarding the provision of ODA.  
In the second scenario, however, development policies are more independent. 
They are used to create civilianized structures in weaker countries, either through the 
support of the government to act as effective service deliverers or through the support of 
other agencies like NGOs. Deficiencies in political performance, especially with respect 
to good governance and human rights, are pointed out a lot more rigorously in this 
scenario than they are in the first one (Author interview with Interviewee D, KfW).  
It is important to note that, even in the second scenario where development 
policies are somewhat independent from foreign policies, they are still used as tools to 
reach the broader foreign political interest in creating civilianized structures in Africa.   
Those realpolitikal interests become clearly evident in the Afrika-Konzept of the BMZ in 
2001 as it emphasizes the security aspect of its development politics as mentioned 
above. Announcing their own national security as one of the pillars of development 
politics clearly illustrates that those are conducted by rationality and broader foreign 
political interests. Through increasing global interdependencies and changing 
geopolitical conditions, such realpolitikal interests experienced an entirely new 
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motivation in the late 1990s, because it became obvious that state failure in Africa can 
be a serious concern to European security interests.  
The common interest in avoiding state failure and in creating stable social, 
economic and political conditions led to a more intense engagement with Africa. 
Germany and other Western countries are acting according to the rationale that increased 
engagement now to improve living conditions helps to prevent severe long-term costs 
which might arise in future if the situation severely deteriorates. Such long-term costs 
can all be factors threatening the civilianized international system which is essential for 
Germany. If we also take into account indirect linkages, it becomes very obvious that the 
major underlying motivation for development cooperation is driven by geopolitical 
interests (Author interviews with Interviewee C, German diplomat; and Interviewee E, 
GTZ).  
However, development policies are certainly not exclusively motivated by ‘hard’ 
geopolitical interest. Civilian powers have a humanitarian component: the terms ‘human 
rights’, ‘social and economic balance’, and ‘universal norms’ are central to the concept. 
With regard to Africa, those components have a larger influence on development 
cooperation than with countries such as China. 
The purpose of this research is not to prove or disprove the humanitarian 
character of German development policies. Nor is it to show that development policies 
are a decisive component in German grand strategy. They are not! Even though the 
official statements and documents try to communicate that point, the data on funding for 
ODA clearly shows that this is not the case. Despite the increased awareness of the 
importance of developing countries, development policies are still very much 
subordinate to broader foreign policies. The purpose of this study is not to show the 
relevance of development policies to German grand strategy as a civilian power, but to 
show the relevance of the grand strategy to German development policies. This character 
will be illustrated in the following six examples. The first three are specific to the 
German engagement in Kenya. The last three examples show the more general civilian 
power aspects of German development policies.  
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First, with respect to regional security and stability in Eastern Africa Kenya holds 
the central position. In December 2002, Kenya set an example for other African states by 
holding free and fair elections. An authoritarian regime that had lasted for almost 40 
years, first under the founder of the nation, Jomo Kenyatta, and from 1978 onwards 
under Daniel Arap Moi, was replaced in democratic elections by the opposition party. 
Mwai Kibaki, the head of the National Rainbow Coalition, a multiethnic group formed 
out of various opposition parties, became president. As legitimacy increased, resistance 
against the former regime declined, and the risk for state failure also decreased. The new 
democratically elected government based on a consensual coalition of various ethnic and 
political groups conforms much more to civilianized structures as envisioned by 
Germany. In order to support the democratic shift and the new government, Germany 
provided € 14.3 m ($ 17.7 m) of special commitments as a reaction to the democratic 
elections. In the following year those commitments were made permanent, so that the 
German government more than doubled its bilateral commitments from € 13 m ($ 16.12 
m) to € 27.5 m ($ 34.1 m) (AA 2005).  
Second, the GTZ provides significant support for the Peace Support and Training 
Centre (PSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya on a financial, technical and know-how level. The 
PSTC is one of five regional African training facilities to enhance the quality of 
peacekeeping missions and to train peacekeepers with respect to civilian aspects in 
military operations, peace keeping and the post-war reconstruction of civilian structures 
(Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).  
Third, on behalf of the UNHCR, the GTZ manages the large refugee camps of 
Dadaab and Kakuma in the northern part of Kenya. The camps host a total of 240,000 
refugees, mainly from the surrounding fragile countries, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, the northern part of Uganda, and the Congo. This engagement is a central part of 
the strategy to avoid a worsening of the situation in already unstable areas. Conflict 
intensity around the Great Lakes is a humanitarian disaster and a severe threat to 
political stability as refugees can be easy recruits for criminal organizations. Refugee 
camps are supposed to ease some of the human suffering and counteract some of the 
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problems associated with refugees caused by conflicts (Author interview with 
Interviewee B, GTZ).  
Fourth, German development cooperation focuses on ‘high potential areas’. It 
tries to counteract situations considered as specifically problematic in order to avoid an 
aggravation of circumstances to a level where problems spread out with more severe 
consequences (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat). For instance, in 
Kenya the German efforts to fight HIV/AIDS focus on the provinces with the highest 
prevalence rates and the goal to reduce prevalence there. Choosing ‘high potential areas’ 
for intense engagement was a result of the policy of Schwerpunktbildung begun in 2000. 
The focus on fewer countries and sectors expresses the more politicized nature of 
development cooperation with respect to the goal to use it more precisely where it is 
considered as specifically important.   
Fifth, German development policies are conflict averse with regard to its 
partners. Development Policies are subordinate to the other central civilian power 
aspects of foreign policy, such as effective institutions and good relations with partners. 
Germany usually does not risk a serious disagreement with its key partners in the EU or 
NATO over issues like development projects in Africa. The overall goal of credible and 
effective alliances and institutions is regarded as far more important than a specific 
development issue. Germany’s development policies are conflict averse because they are 
supposed to support broader foreign policy goals and not create additional problems 
(Mair 2002, 16). For instance, France’s ongoing insistence on primacy in francophone 
Africa continuously caused disagreements with Germany and other European partners. 
In order to avoid problems arising from those disagreements, Germany eventually 
focused its engagement in Africa on the Anglophone part (Mair 1999). This conflict 
aversion applies to Germany’s OECD partner countries as well as to powerful 
developing and transitional countries, such as China or Indonesia.  
Sixth, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss has its roots in the civilian 
power character of German foreign policy. As illustrated in figure 20 German 
development policies are strongly multilateral and integrated into international 
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institutions. In 2004, Germany provided $ 3.71 bn (€ 2.99 bn) of multilateral ODA. In 
absolute terms this was the highest number of all OECD donor countries. In relative 
terms it accounted for 49% of total German ODA and was second only to Italy. 
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Figure 20: Bi- and multilateral ODA of G7- countries. Source: OECD 2006c 
 
The fact that Germany spends almost half of its total ODA multilaterally is 
clearly congruent with the civilian power ideas of multilateralism, institution-building 
and supranational integration. Even the bilateral share of German ODA is for the most 
part spent after intense multilateral exchange and coordination. With the changes in 2000 
(Schwerpunktbildung and Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss), the goal was 
set to make assistance more efficient through intensified coordination of all development 
efforts in respective countries. This is based on frequent and close cooperation of all the 
actors involved, such as the local authorities, NGOs, bi- and multilateral donors (Author 
interviews with Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee D, KfW). Such an approach is 
very different to the development policies of a great power. As argued in section 3.3, 
those are a lot more unilateral and less based on cooperation and consultation. Figure 20 
also clearly shows this distinction, with the high multilateral share of German ODA, 
compared to the United States which only spends 18 percent of its ODA multilaterally.  
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Table 5 compares the characteristics for civilian power as seen in table 4 with the 
characteristics of German development policies based on the conditions from 1991 and 
the foci outlined in 1998.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of the criteria for civilian powers and German development policies
Civilian Power Development Policies
multilateralism and supranational integration mulitlateralism and conflict aversion
rule of law and institution-building rule of law and legal certainty
free trade and social and economic balance social market economy
rejection of the use of force crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution
human rights and binding norms human rights and participation
 
 
A comparison of the criteria on either side illustrates that German development 
policies are clearly influenced by its grand strategy as a civilian power. In 1993 Maull 
argued that “Civilian powers are states which are willing and able to advance the 
civilianization of the international system [and] the rule of law” (Maull 1993). 
Schröder’s first coalition agreement in 1998 stated with respect to development policies 
that “they are guided by the commitment to further civilianization and the rule of law in 
international relations” (translated from SPD/Grüne 1998). 
The phrasing of the coalition agreement copies the academic work on the civilian 
power concept almost word for word. Germany developed into a civilian power during 
the Cold War because within this framework it regained wealth and influence in the 
international system. The name ‘civilian power’ was developed in context with an ideal 
typical role concept intended to explain the foreign political behavior of Germany during 
that time. Hence, it is certainly not surprising that foreign policies, and development 
policies, followed fairly closely the ideal typical role concept. However, major changes 
have occurred since the role concept was first formulated in 1990. When Germany 
developed into a civilian power during the Cold War, it did so unconsciously. Policy 
makers acted the way they did not because they were guided by a grand strategy, but 
because of underlying norms and values resulting from the historical experiences of 
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World War II and because of a desire to rebuild Germany and become re-integrated in to 
the Western world-economy. This was as much a choice of German elites and the 
German people as it was a force of circumstances and of the international system 
provided by American hegemony.  
German foreign political behavior since reunification has become more 
independent and less a result of the forces of circumstances. With reunification and 
European integration Germany became bigger and in certain ways also more influential. 
Its foreign political behavior aimed less at adapting to a certain international system and 
more at shaping that international system. The international system in question has 
largely been provided by the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, 
with Germany creating its foreign policy in order to adapt to that international system 
and thus enjoying the benefits of it as a free rider. It did so successfully, became an 
integral part of the system, and depends on its continued functioning to maintain an 
influential role in international relations.  
The academic conceptualization of the civilian power concept helped policy 
makers to realize the importance of promoting such an international system. It could no 
longer be taken for granted and if Germany sought to increase its role in the world it 
could no longer benefit from the American system as a free rider. Instead it needed to 
engage independently in order to create an international environment favorable to its 
internalized foreign policy identity. German policy makers realized that the academic 
conceptualization of civilian power in fact explained past foreign policy reasonably well 
and provided useful suggestions for future foreign policies. The way Germany had acted 
unconsciously in the past became recognized as the most promising way for Germany to 
consciously conduct foreign policy in future in order to act successfully on the 
international stage.  
Such a realization had an impact on foreign policies much earlier than on 
development policies. Changing geopolitical conditions in the 1990s meant it was only 
logical for Schröder’s administration to consider development policies as ‘global 
structural policies’ in 1998. As soon as it became clear that through globalization and 
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global interdependencies the situation in the developing world could severely impact 
Germany’s national interests, it was only a matter of time until development policies 
would be more strongly embedded into Germany’s grand strategy and its broader foreign 
political considerations. This is precisely the case with respect to current German 
development cooperation.  
 
Summary 
 
The foreign political behavior of Germany as a civilian power differs quite 
significantly from that of the United States as a great power. Multilateralism, the 
restriction of the use of force, and supranational integration are central to Germany’s 
foreign policies. The United States is a lot less or, in the case of supranational 
integration, not at all, committed to those attributes. Even though both the United States 
as a great power and Germany as a civilian power employ both hard power and soft 
power to reach their international goals, there is a clear tendency for a civilian power to 
focus on soft and integrative power, whereas hard power is more relevant to the foreign 
policies of a great power. This is as much a matter of political choice as it is a matter of 
capabilities. A great power simply possesses more hard power means of power 
projection, above all a strong military, and is also willing to use those means. The 
strength of a civilian power lies in the effective deployment of soft power. It can usually 
build on high levels of integrative power created by a commitment to cooperative and 
collective decision making, which is central to the civilian power concept.  
Those trends are clearly obvious in German development policies. After 
reunification in 1990, such policies underwent two major changes. In 1991, five 
conditions for the provision of development cooperation were outlined. In 1998, 
development policies became far more politicized and tied into the broader foreign 
political framework. In the international comparison, Germany is the fifth largest donor 
of development assistance, but lags severely behind the goal of spending 0.7% of its 
GNI on development cooperation.  
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Reproductive Health and the fight against HIV/AIDS is one of three German 
development priorities in Kenya as a priority partner country for German development 
cooperation. German efforts are very closely related to the Kenyan strategy to fight the 
disease and conducted in cooperation with other donors and local organizations. The 
main goal is to reach a comprehensive and integrative approach, not only with respect to 
the donor community, but also with respect to actions taken locally. HIV/AIDS is not 
only supposed to be fought as a health problem, but as a problem for social, economic 
and political development. Therefore the projects to fight the epidemic should be 
included in all spheres of Kenyan state action and the donor’s development cooperation.   
These strongly multilateral and cooperative programs to fight HIV/AIDS in 
Kenya are a clear example of how German development politics in general reflect 
civilian power ideals. With spending roughly half its total ODA multilaterally, mainly 
through the EU, German development cooperation is much more multilateral than that of 
other OECD countries. This is a result of Germany’s foreign policy identity as a civilian 
power, which strongly favors multilateralism. The major changes in development 
policies after reunification show strong coherence with the ideal typical role concept of a 
civilian power. German development policies are embedded in its broader foreign 
political interests rooted in the grand strategy. They are a tool to pursue the interest of 
promoting a civilianized international system which Germany needs to operate 
effectively in the international system.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Germany’s interest in Africa during the 20th century has gone through several 
different phases. There has always been an economic interest with respect to the 
extraction of African resources. In addition there has also almost always been a certain 
strategic interest. This has shifted for different reasons depending on the role Germany 
was playing in the international system at the time.  
During Germany’s imperialist period before World War I, the economic interest 
was stronger than in any other period. Germany’s increasing ambition to become a great 
power and maybe succeed Britain as the global hegemon led to the German ‘Grab for 
Africa’. Even though Wilhelmine Germany pursued a policy of substituting tropical and 
subtropical imports through a focus on science and the goal to produce artificial 
replacements, this did not mean that it would not strive for colonies in Africa (Hugill and 
Bachmann 2005, 162-163).  
Germany believed that resources were necessary to compete economically with 
other great powers, however, to a large extent German colonialism in Africa was also a 
matter of prestige if it was to be considered ‘equal’ to those other powers. It became an 
official war aim for Germany in the World War I to acquire a large colonial empire in 
central Africa – Mittelafrika. This expansionism was rooted in both the attitude of 
German economic and political elites and in the attitude of the general population. 
Germany had been growing and thriving for two generations before World War I and 
people strongly believed that it was time for Germany to acquire a ‘place in the sun’ 
(Fischer 1967, 7).  
There was no specific plan with regard to Africa in Nazi-Germany. Those who 
called for the re-acquisition of the former colonies did so based on a general opposition 
to the Treaty of Versailles. Even more so than in Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi-Germany 
focused on science as a substitute for tropical imports. Some economic interest in the 
availability of African resources was still present, but it was of no major relevance. The 
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only real interest in Africa was that it would become part of a German pan-region. This 
concept was based on the geopolitical visions of Karl Haushofer and was different from 
the classical concept of colonial control. It did not call for total political control, rather 
for the inclusion of Africa in Germany’s sphere of influence. Official Nazi-policy, 
however, differed to some extent because it was more radical and sought to dominate the 
entire world. Nonetheless, with respect to Africa and unlike before World War I there 
was no specific plan. 
During the Cold War, Germany’s interest in Africa was motivated by other 
foreign political considerations, mainly the integration into the Western world under 
American hegemony. Economic interests were limited and the strategic interest of 
integration determined Germany’s Africa policy. Germany tried to fulfill the 
expectations of its European partners with respect to burden sharing on the continent that 
was about to decolonize. Germany also very quickly became a part of the American led 
economic and political international system. As such, one of its main interests in Africa 
was to counteract the spread of Soviet influence on the continent. The Hallstein-doctrine 
determined German Africa policy throughout most of the 1960s. It denied diplomatic 
contact to any country which would officially recognize the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR).  
 After the Cold War, Germany’s interest in Africa was substantially reduced. 
There was still a limited economic interest in the availability of resources, but strategic 
interest almost completely ceased to exist in the early 1990s due to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Germany focused on its own reunification and European integration, and 
African resources continued to flow. There was no need for Germany to engage heavily 
on the African continent. However, German reunification and geopolitical changes in the 
1990s changed the rules of the game. Reunification was followed by a political 
reorientation which resulted in Germany’s realization that it could no longer enjoy the 
benefits of an American international system as a free rider, but needed to engage more 
actively on an international level. Germany had become dependent on a civilianized 
international system by adapting to and co-operating in an international system America 
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established after World War II and which had allowed Germany to rebuild and 
reintegrate. Maull points out that  
 
During the post-war period (West) German foreign policy settled into the 
mould of a ‘civilian power’ – a particular foreign policy identity or ‘role 
concept’ which promotes multilateralism, institution-building, and 
supranational integration and tries to constrain the use of force in 
international relations through national and international norms. (Maull 
2004, 89) 
 
Germany grand strategy is now based on this role concept and Germany’s prime 
geopolitical interest is the promotion of a civilianized international system, because it 
needs such structures to operate effectively on the international level.  
Global interdependencies and globalization have shown that the situation in 
Africa can have major impacts on the overall functioning of such a system. Therefore, 
during the 1990s Germany once again developed a strategic interest in Africa: the 
creation of civilianized structures in order to include African countries in a civilianized 
international system.  
This is the first time in German history that it has developed an independent 
strategic interest in Africa. If we assume that economic interests in the availability of 
African resources have remained largely unchanged during the past century, we can 
point out three phases of strategic interest. First, Imperial Germany and its desire to 
acquire colonies for prestige in order to be ‘equal’ to the other great powers. Second, 
Germany during the Cold War and its engagement in Africa in order to re-integrate into 
the Western community and to counteract Soviet influence. Third, a reunified Germany 
and the need to promote civilianized structures for a civilianized international system to 
work. Only in the third case is the German interest not a result of external political 
constellations. In the first case Germany perceived itself in a ‘second rank’ – position if 
it did not possess colonies as other major powers did. In the second case Germany 
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wished to be seen by the Western partners as a reliable partner. In the third case, the 
German interest is not influenced by such external forces, but derives from its own 
national interest in promoting the specific international system Germany needs to 
operate effectively. 
The functioning of such a system requires the actors in it to be “peaceful and 
civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding” (Mair 2002, 11). State 
failure in Africa counteracts such conditions. Failing states do not fulfill any of those 
criteria. They are characterized by the collapse of state authority and state power, 
lawlessness and increasing anarchy, the rise of criminal and terrorist networks, crime 
and violence, and humanitarian crisis and suppression. This is in fundamental contrast to 
the civilian structures needed for a civilianized international system. State failure, thus, 
is in fundamental conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest.  
The problems associated with high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS are conducive 
to state failure.  The extent with which HIV/AIDS has impacted sub-Saharan African is 
unmatched in any other part of the world. Even though the spread of the pandemic has 
slowed recently, more and more people become infected each year. HIV/AIDS is a 
serious obstacle to development in sub-Saharan Africa. It severely cuts into family and 
social structures by killing the part of the population needed most in the society and 
economy: young adults. This causes massive destruction of current as well as future 
human capital. AIDS leaves behind millions of orphans who are unlikely to receive 
adequate education because they are forced to make a living for themselves. The effects 
on productivity and the economy are enormous, especially on agriculture, education, and 
security.  
First, food security and the income from foreign exchange from cash crop 
production are severely threatened if a country is not capable of maintaining a 
productive agricultural sector. Second, education systems suffer severely from the loss 
of teachers due to AIDS and the burden of educating millions of young people in order 
to replace the human capital killed by AIDS. Third, AIDS severely undercuts state 
capacity and leaves many African security forces extremely weakened or not deployable. 
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This means that, for African states, the maintenance of internal law and order, as well as 
external peacekeeping operations, becomes extremely difficult, because AIDS leaves 
their power projection tools ineffective.  
Those problems are conducive to state failure and are thus serious obstacles to 
the establishment of civilian structures. This is not to say that high AIDS prevalence 
rates automatically cause state failure. Botswana, the world’s most affected country, 
shows that is not necessarily the case. However, high prevalence rates are likely to create 
conditions favorable to state failure. Hence, there are strong indirect links between high 
prevalence rates, sustainable development, state failure, and civilian structures: the 
higher the prevalence rates, the more difficult sustainable development; the more likely 
state failure, the harder the establishment of civilian structures.  
The German vision of how the world should operate is rooted in the liberal world 
order that the United States provided after World War II, an order that allowed Germany 
to recover from the war. This vision has determined German foreign policy for more 
than five decades now. Several years after Germany became reunified and hence one of 
the bigger ‘middle-sized powers’ it emerged with a clearly stated grand strategy based 
on its foreign policy identity as a civilian power and rooted in all its post-1945 
experience. Germany has now no choice but to use its foreign policies to maintain this 
civilianized international system where it is in danger and to establish it where it is not in 
place.  
The overall goal of promoting a civilianized international system is also apparent 
in German development policies and was exemplified in two major changes during the 
1990s. First, in 1991 compliance with human rights, participation of the population in 
the political process, validity of the rule of law, creation of a market-friendly system, and 
development-orientation of state organs were outlined as conditions for the provision of 
German development cooperation. Second, in 1998 an additional focus was put on 
human rights, crisis prevention, and peaceful conflict resolution, as well as on 
civilianization and the rule of law in international relations. On the practical side these 
changes meant a ‘priority setting’ (Schwerpunktbildung) and a more ‘seamless 
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development cooperation’ (Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss). Through 
Schwerpunktbildung German development cooperation became more selective and, thus, 
focused on certain countries and sectors. Kenya was chosen as a priority partner country 
for German development cooperation, and reproductive health as one of three 
development priorities in Kenya.  
Germany has been active in the HIV/AIDS sector in Kenya for almost twenty 
years, resulting in a significant influence on the Kenyan strategy to fight the disease. 
German and Kenyan policies are largely similar. German programs are characterized by 
cooperation and consultation with other donors and organizations working in the field. 
They aim at being inclusive and integrative with respect to both the provision of ODA 
from the donor community and mainstreaming the problem in all spheres of society and 
state. As such German programs differ radically from the American AIDS policies, 
which are more unilateral and show a much less cooperative and consultative character. 
The civilian power character, thus, comes out clearly in the conduct of German 
development policies.  
Germany’s prime interest, however, is in the overall functioning of the 
civilianized international system.  In these efforts developing countries only play a fairly 
small role, because despite the increased attention they have received in recent years, 
developing countries are still minor players in global politics.  Germany’s main foreign 
political focus is still on the major players. Certainly, Germany is more concerned with 
developing countries now than it was a decade ago and development policies have 
become more important in its broader foreign political framework. German official 
documents and statements of politicians presented in this work prove that point. 
However, there is a serious gap between such statements and the actual policies. German 
ODA seriously lags behind the commitments made in both absolute and relative terms. 
Development policies are far from playing the role in Germany’s international 
engagement officials and documents claim they play. Just as developing countries are 
minor players in international relations, German development policies are a minor part 
of Germany’s geopolitical strategy.  
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On the other hand, however, the geopolitical strategy drives German 
development policies. The changes in 1998 clearly reflect the civilian power orientation 
of development policies. They reflect exactly the foreign political behavior of a civilian 
power, with respect to their conception, their conduct, and their relevance within the 
broader foreign political framework.   
First, civilian power ideals are reflected in the conception of development 
policies because the characteristics for a civilian power are clearly outlined as goals for 
development policies.  
Second, civilian power ideals are reflected in the conduct of development 
policies because Germany acts in a highly multilateral, as well as consensual, 
consultative, and cooperative fashion with other donors and local agencies.  
Third, civilian power ideals are reflected in the relevance of development policies 
within the broader foreign political framework because they are conflict averse. The 
main foreign political goal of a civilian power is the overall peaceful functioning of a 
civilianized international system. Even though development policies fully aim at this 
goal, they only remain independent as long as they do not cause frictions with any of the 
main players in world politics. It is more important to have those players, be it OECD 
partners or powerful developing or transitional countries, included in the system than to 
insist on a specific development issue. German development policies are highly conflict 
averse and clearly subordinate to other foreign political interests. Development policies 
are supposed to assist the main geopolitical goal of an inclusive civilianized international 
system, instead of creating frictions between its major players.  
The long-term maintenance and promotion of the civilianized international 
system is associated with costs which Germany naturally tries to keep as low as possible. 
Such costs include the immediate costs of development cooperation or future costs such 
as having to deal with state failure and the associated broader international implications. 
Germany and other western countries have realized that it is cheaper to fight the causes 
of state failure and other problems in Africa than it is to deal with the consequences 
when they spill out of Africa. It is a simple cost-benefit calculation, with Germany 
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acting the way it does in order to keep its version of the international system going at 
relatively low costs. I believe Germany has a strong and serious interest in creating 
better living conditions in Africa, but I also believe that to do so is in the German 
national interest. Non-engagement would mean potentially very unpleasant 
consequences.  
German development policies aim at preventing such unpleasant consequences 
and are, thus, part of Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power. This grand strategy 
includes a humanitarian component based on values and norms resulting from the 
historical experience of World War II and the period of rebuilding and re-integrating 
Germany. This humanitarian component spills over into German development policies, 
but within the overall framework of geopolitical interests rooted in the civilian power 
concept. However much development policies are motivated by humanitarian reasons, 
for the most part they are used as tools to promote Germany’s broader geopolitical 
interest of a civilianized international system.  
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